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Researchers and religious adherents alike have witnessed decreasing affiliation 
rates and the rise of the “nones”, or Americans who do not affiliate with any religion. 
 The American Jewish Community has become increasingly concerned with the decrease 
in participation, commitment, and influence the Jewish community has imbued on the 
Millennial generation of American Jews. Thus, literature on identity and its constructs, 
geography and religion, and Jewish identity in America are presented. I analyzed data 
from the 2013 Pew Portrait of Jewish Americans and aggregated institutional data to 
explore individual-level, spatial, institutional, and religious economy characteristics that 
determine the strength of Jewish identity in the United States. These variables have their 
own effects on the four discrete measures of Jewish identity: religious identity, cultural 
identity, denominational switching, and conversion into and out of Judaism. Crucial 
findings are specified in congruence with one another, such as Millennials aged 18-39, 
are the most affected in both positive and negative ways, thus supporting the hypothesis 
that identity formation is the most formative in adolescence and young adulthood. In 
addition, going to Israel has a huge positive impact on conversion, religious and cultural 
 vii 
identities, and intermarriage. With regard to intermarriage, there is a negative impact on 
every measure of identity, although this impact is diminished by visiting Israel. Lastly, 
the presence of Jewish congregations, and in some cases Jewish schools and camps, 
increases several measures of Jewish identity, and as such, it can be concluded that at 
least some institutions have a significant impact on identity. The paper concludes with a 
final discussion on the possibility for future research and implications for Jewish identity 
in the United States. 
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For the past few decades in the United States, researchers and religious adherents 
alike have witnessed decreasing affiliation rates and the rise of the “nones”, or Americans 
who do not affiliate with any religion (Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life 
Project 2012; Pew 2014). Mark Chaves of Duke University ascertains that in the United 
States, “no traditional religious belief or practice has increased in recent decades” (2011). 
There are several hypotheses attributed to this phenomenon. One reason suggests that the 
younger, less affiliated generations are supplanting the older, more practicing 
generations. Alternatively, as fewer people are attending services, survey participants are 
much more likely to label themselves as disaffiliated (Pew Research Center’s Religion & 
Public Life Project 2012). Perhaps Robert Putnam’s work is in action here, attributing 
this growth to a macro cultural shift in social disengagement (2000). 
Regardless of the reasons behind these changes, the Jewish community has also 
experienced these phenomena. The American Jewish Community has become 
increasingly concerned with the decrease in participation, commitment, and influence the 
Jewish community has imbued on the Millennial generation of American Jews, especially 
since the Pew released a Portrait of Jewish Americans in 2013. The importance of being 
Jewish in America has declined, with a rise in disaffiliation, especially in younger Jews 
(A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013; Rebhun 2004).  Furthermore, intermarriage is 
changing the cultural value of being Jewish in the United States, as intermarriage leads to 
a decrease in institutional participation, which can be a main reason for younger 
generations’ decreased Jewish identity (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013). 
In this spirit, this study seeks to identify factors that affect Jewish identity in the 
United States. This paper adopts a more multidimensional approach-- both conceptually 
 2 
and empirically-- than past research. From a conceptual standpoint, this paper 
incorporates four discrete measures of Jewish identity: a religious identity scale, a 
cultural identity scale, denominational switching within the Jewish framework, and 
conversion in and out of Judaism entirely. These scales employ the same type of 
distinctions between cultural and religious identity used by scholars Ira Sheskin, Arnold 
Dashefsky, and Harriet Hartman. However, by incorporating movement from one 
denomination or religious tradition to another into the analysis, it more effectively 
captures the multidimensional nature of Jewish identity as it is seen today. 
From the empirical perspective, this research uses a wide array of explanatory 
variables to get to the core of Jewish identity. Aside from the standard set of individual-
level characteristics available—especially age, education, region of residence, and having 
been to Israel—the analysis looks at the effects of parents’ intermarriage, proximity to a 
range of Jewish institutions that are modeled both spatially and hierarchically, and 
proximity to congregations with other religious traditions. Combining these variables 
allows me to evaluate more general effects of the religious economy on different types of 
Jewish identity, and to do so for Jews in different age groups. To the best of my 
knowledge, up until now, no researcher has taken a conceptual and empirical approach as 
complex as this. 
Interestingly, the tension between religious and cultural identity in Judaism adds 
an attractive layer to other debates about identity, such as the movement into a religious 
denomination versus adopting a general cultural identity as “Jewish”. This shift is 
relatively new in Jewish identity, important to explore and understand. No one has yet to 
examine the relationship between proximity to different types of Jewish instittions on noe 
hand, and the strength of Jewish religious and cultural identities on the other. Thus, it is 
important to see if the presence of Jewish institutions in communities can be of direct 
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impact to identity, and which types of institutions, if any, have this impact. Indeed, for 
Jews who are concerned with the continuity of Judaism, and others who see this 
phenomenon or the rise of the “nones” occurring in their religious groups across the 
country, these notions are sufficient motivators to studying religious identity and its 
connection with the community. If one’s identity impacts one’s willingness to participate 
and affiliate with one’s religious or culture group, and participation rates for younger 
generations are low, then it is crucial to examine factors that can positively impact 





Identity and its Constructs  
         Several frameworks have been developed to explain how an individual’s 
identity is shaped. For the purposes of this thesis, the crucial distinction between them is 
the relative weight of developmental versus social-structural characteristics. 
Frameworks associated with Erik Erikson and James Marcia represent the first of 
these. Erikson’s was the first major contributor to the study of identity formation. He 
notes that throughout life, conflicts arise in a variety of contexts, and how one resolves 
them impacts an individual’s identity (Grotevant 1987). This “identity versus role 
confusion” stage occurs predominantly during one’s adolescence, and it is during this 
time that the vast majority of one’s identity is shaped, even though it will continually be 
influenced by external forces. If the adolescent successfully resolves this crisis, then this 
individual will embody the values and goals that enabled him or her to make that 
decision, and be propelled to the next stage of identity development, in which the 
individual develops committed relationships with others (Grotevant 1987). If, however, 
the individual does not succeed in this stage, then he or she will face confusion about 
future goals and plans which will inhibit personal growth. 
A somewhat different set of theories about identity places more emphasis on a 
tension between individual and structural factors. Douglas Ezzy posits that rather than 
focusing on the adolescent age as most crucial for formation, he considers identity to be 
continuously formed through a narrative script of one’s lived experiences (1998). To 
expand, Ezzy considers a narrative aspect of identity, such that the self is perceived and 
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portrayed as an amalgamation of autobiographies and past experiences (1998). Indeed, 
this theory relies heavily on the “social sources of the self-concept” as an individual 
considers notable experiences, perceived reactions of their actions by others, and 
situational contexts to meld together into the evaluation of oneself (1998:239). 
Likewise, Stryker and Burke also consider lived experience as a contributor to 
one’s identity (2000). In particular, they review the theoretical divide between social 
structures and internal processes as the main determinants for identity. They suggest that 
identity formation considers both external and internal forces, and that meaning attributed 
to individuals’ roles and experiences in society truly develops one’s sense of self. Equally 
important, different roles and networks breed distinct identities, and as such, in varying 
contexts, individuals choose which aspects of their identity they wish to make most 
salient (Stryker and Burke 2000). 
Erving Goffman also considers the interplay between external and internal 
structures affecting one’s identity. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, he 
describes how social structures such as scripts, roles, and audiences influence the 
formation of identity. To expand, there is an “audience” which includes everyone else in 
society that an individual interacts with (Goffman 1959). An audience observes the 
performer, the individual, and assesses, interprets, and internalizes the performer’s 
actions while the performer simultaneously continues to shape her impression of self by 
subconsciously internalizing the responses from the audience. So too,  the macro and 
micro structural relationship is intertwined, such that the script is constructed by the 
social system, yet it is embodied by the individual and manifests as one’s identity 
(Goffman 1959). 
Lastly, Sayers relies most on the social-structural forces of identity formation 
(1999). He recognizes that humans are social beings that are unable to detach from the 
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societies, structures, and roles that surround them, and thus there is considerable 
influence from these forces onto one’s personal identity. Indeed, there are some shared 
aspects of identity that stem from the commonality of certain structures, such as people 
living in the same nation or community. Yet, these structures only provide a general 
framework to identity, and the diverse contexts people embed themselves in lead to 
conflicts between these competing forces (1999). According to Sayers, it is through these 
conflicts that individual identities develop, albeit still situated in this social and formative 
context (1999). Thus, according to Sayers, Goffman, Stryker and Burke, social contexts 
matter, and as such, institutions in these social contexts should influence one’s identity. 
 
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT IMPACT IDENTITY 
 
There are more nuanced theories behind the effect of one’s life course and age on 
identity formation. Waterman (1982) agrees with Erikson’s theory that identity mostly 
develops from adolescence through adulthood, with a particular growth stage occurring 
during college years, or ages 18 to mid-twenties. Similarly, Waterman (1982) and 
Grotevant (1987) find that college environments are not only diverse in and of 
themselves, but are very different environments than the individual was accustomed to 
prior to going away. Thus, moving to college is a significant period of identity 
exploration. 
A related literature addresses identity change during high school years. Waterman 
(1982) suggests that identity does not change tremendously before these years (1982). 
Similarly, Phinney and Alipuria (1990) conclude that over half of the Black and White 
eighth and tenth grade students who participated in their study showed little, if any, 
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concern or considering of their ethnic identities, thus confirming that conscious formation 
does not occur for most people until later in life. However, neither Waterman nor Erikson 
suggest an age range when identity formation stops, rather claiming that identity is 
strengthened in adulthood but not really changed. In a more recent article, Waterman 
(1999) introduces a specific cohort mechanism. He argues that although identity does not 
change much, any change is dependent on the state of society during adolescence, the 
time of greatest development, and the availability and encouragement to reflect on these 
changes later in adulthood. Indeed, Waterman suggests that individuals only change, if at 
all, when they are faced with an opportunity to change and the social contexts that 
supports and enables that change, or when the older identity is more costly to maintain. 
Without this supportive context, change in one’s identity in adulthood is unlikely. 
Similarly, Grotevant (1987) notes that life events such as divorce, having a child, and 
graduation can spark an exploration in one’s identity and corresponding values and goals. 
He suggests that certain identity issues occurring in one stage of life can shape 
consequent decisions, thus asserting an interdependency between identity issues and 
choices, regardless of one’s age at the time of these issues. 
Specific to religious identity, there is also theoretical justification that religious 
identity formation is developed in large part due to social forces. Some of these 
influential forces include education, socioeconomic status, age, and religion (Kress and 
Elias n.d.; Hartman and Hartman 1996a; Hartman and Hartman 1996b; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). To enumerate, Hartman and Hartman conclude that a higher 
socioeconomic status, accounting for education, household income, and housing value, 
positively correlates to community religious identity (1996a). Age and cohort effects also 
impact the salience of religious identities, such that older generations have a stronger 
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sense of communal religious identity whereas younger generations have a stronger 
private religious identity (Putnam and Campell 2010; Sered 1992). 
Furthermore, Kress and Elias suggest that the commitment to one’s religious 
identity is mediated by social forces such as peer group, education, family settings, and 
“general community religious climate” (n.d.:8). Likewise, meaning found in religion is 
essential for and contributes to identity formation in one’s adolescence (Erikson 1964). 
Religiosity also provides individuals with a unique setting to explore identity, and 
contributes to commitment and purposefulness to identity. So too, religious individuals 
will consciously shape their identity more so than allowing this process to occur without 
awareness (King 2003; Youniss, McLellan and Yates 1999). Along these lines, youth 
who view religion as important are more likely to volunteer in their community, resulting 
in being more engaged citizens (Youniss, McLellan, and Yates 1999). Hartman and 
Hartman agree with King, suggesting that identifying with religious tradition links 
individuals to a meaningful and continual history with sustained roots and secured future 
growth (1999). Therefore, an individual looks to their places in society and links on core 
meanings and a core culture that tradition, especially religious tradition, provides 
(Hartman and Hartman 1999). 
Lastly, moving also impacts identity formation. Rebhun (1995) identifies a 
correlation between geographic mobility and Jewish identity. Because of Jews’ higher 
than average socioeconomic status, it gives this group a higher opportunity and likelihood 
to be mobile, even compared to other whites and controlling for educational moves 
(Rebhun 1997). However, moving interrupts one’s connection to the community present 
in the original environment, and it takes time to get connected to the new religious 
community. Geographic mobility can therefore negatively impact Jewish identity, such 
that moving from one community to another weakens one’s Jewish identity (Rebhun 
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1995). Similarly, Rebhun also found that the longer the length of residence in any one 
community, the stronger one’s communal religious and ethnic Jewish identities 
(forthcoming).   
 
Geography on Religion 
The area where one lives has a major impact on one’s identity. To get a better 
sense of the diverse compositions of communities, there are several key distinctions 
between urban and rural environments. In their meta-analysis of social capital in both 
urban and rural communities, Sandra L. Hofferth and John Iceland (1998) point out that 
families in rural communities mainly consist of older adults and younger children. This 
contrasts with urban households, which primarily consist of young adults and middle-
aged adults. Furthermore, rural communities are more ethnically homogenous in nature, 
thereby consisting of fewer minority families. On the other hand, cities are hotbeds for 
immigration of ethnic minorities. These distinctions highlight how the heterogeneity of 
cities can increase an individual’s awareness of other social groups’ tastes, religious 
preferences, and also enhance one’s tolerance of these groups (Hofferth and Iceland 
1998). Moreover, mean per-capita income levels for people living outside of cities are 
33% lower than their city counterparts (Fuguitt 1989, cited in Hofferth and Iceland 1998).  
Since money affords people the prospect of mobility, city dwellers more so than rural 
dwellers, have a greater opportunity to move, and thus could be a reason why rural 
communities are more homogenous (Hofferth and Iceland 1998). It is important to note 
that these economic and demographic factors are important and can certainly impact an 
individual’s personal development. 
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Aside from the family, the community is the primary location for social contact, 
and thus plays a role in developing concepts of association with others and individual 
expression (Wilkinson 1972, as cited in Summers, 1986). With that said, variances in the 
structure and characteristics of a community, such as size and ethnic and religious 
diversity, can influence individuals in different ways. To examine this idea, a psychology 
experiment (Kashima et al 2004), identified the impact of different-sized cities on a 
person’s development of individual, relational, and collective selves. Kashima’s findings 
show that rural individuals tend to be more interdependent and collectivist whereas urban 
individuals tend to be more individualistic. These findings can shed light on an 
individual’s predisposition and desire to engage with their greater community. 
Religious identification and religious participation are also impacted by where 
one lives in a more structural way. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark frame this effect in 
terms of “religious economies,” using marketplace terminology to comprehend religious 
behavior. They contend that urban environments, which have more types of religions, 
lend themselves to a pluralistic environment that drives these groups into a competitive 
marketplace (1988). Instead of competing for adherents, however, the marketplace will 
allow for all types of religions to thrive, as consumers, or adherents, have distinct beliefs, 
tastes, and ideologies. Thus, consumers of religion no longer need to conform to one 
model, but can choose from the options afforded to them and will be more actively 
involved in their religious institutions. Moreover, because of the spectrum of options in 
the marketplace, institutions themselves need to mobilize more aggressively, or else they 
will lose membership (Finke and Stark 1988). Finally, the religious economies model 
also asserts that religious groups with small market position will mobilize more followers 
and generate participants with increased levels of religious commitment compared to 
religious majority groups (Finke and Stark 1998). Consequently, the more pluralistic the 
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marketplace, the more religious mobilization there will be, meaning that people, 
especially those in the minority group, will have a greater likelihood of religious 
affiliation compared to monistic environments (Finke and Stark 1998). 
Research by Lynn Davidman has reached similar conclusions, albeit in an entirely 
different context. After interviewing dozens of Jewish women stemming from a variety 
of backgrounds, she noted that having a wealth of options within the Jewish framework 
brings “vitality to modern Jewish life” and can “strengthen religious communities” 
(1991:204). Davidman’s findings interestingly corresponds with Finke and Starke’s 
notion that religions’ market share impacts their vigor. Indeed, Jews make up a small 
minority of the greater United States population, thus their minority status could impact 
their activeness in recruiting members to their institutions. Likewise, some argue that 
communal affiliation is essential to retaining a sense of Jewish identity, and that 
institutions made available in the community directly enhance one’s participation in the 
religion (Kivisto and Nefzger 1993; Kress and Elias n.d.). Indeed, Kivisto and Nefzger 
contend that in areas without sufficient institutions, one has to “work harder” to be a Jew 
(1993:7). Accordingly, place affects the types of religions that subsist and activeness of 
participants in these religions (Finke and Stark 1988; Finke and Stark 1998; Silk and 
Walsh 2008). 
 
Jewish Identity in America 
Now that considerable attention has been paid to both (i) identity constructs and 
(ii) place and space, it is important to consider the combination of the two: Jewish 
identity in America. 
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Beginning in the 1880s, with large waves of migration from Eastern Europe, Jews 
in the United States largely lived in ethnic enclaves bound by religious tradition (Ganz 
1956). By the 1950s, however, there was less “social distinctiveness” than in the past, as 
Jews had climbed the socioeconomic ladder to strive and fit into the American middle-
class framework (Ganz 1956:423). Ganz asserts that Jewish identity, or as he defines it, 
Jewishness, is the reason for the strength of the 1950s Jewish community, but goals of 
economic success and representations of middle-class lifestyles encumbered Jewish 
traditional practice (1956). 
The 1970s brought with it the biggest shift in both Jewish identity and the Jewish 
communities, largely because of American politics and world issues occurring at the 
time.  The 1970s was a watershed decade in America. From oil crises to hostages in the 
Middle East, to the rise of feminism and protests against the Vietnam War on the home 
front, Americans experienced immense turmoil, change, and insecurity. Given these 
changes, many Americans turned to religion as a source of stability. Thomas Borstelmann 
suggests that many religious sects “focused inward”, paying respects to the tradition and 
history of their own groups (2012:110). 
By the end of the 1970s, the American Jewish community looked more diverse 
than it ever had in the past. By 1980 the Jewish population had grown to 5.8 million, 
around 2.7% of the total U.S. population (Waxman 1981). Whereas the vast majority of 
Jews used to be concentrated in Northeast cities such as New York and Boston, by 1979 
16% of the Jewish population lived in the South and 14% lived in the West, with only 
58% still living in the Northeast (Waxman 1981). Not only were Jews moving across the 
country but many were also moving away from the city centers. This dispersion not only 
impacted individuals but also the social infrastructure, as new communities needed the 
support of Jewish institutions such as day schools, temples, and kosher butchers in their 
 13 
new places of residence. Although for the Reform and unaffiliated, this mobility may 
have weakened their ties to communal religion, the Orthodox and Conservative 
individuals who moved benefited from this change, as mobility promoted ethnic 
participation (Waxman 1981). 
Alongside this movement was a change in perception of Jews. Jews saw a decline 
in anti-Semitism and were considered “almost-white” as a sympathetic reaction to the 
Holocaust (Schulman 2002). Consequently, Jews moved away from blue-collar and lower 
ranked white-collar work into managerial and proprietary positions, which enabled them 
to become more financially successful than ever before, especially compared to other 
minority groups. Thus, there was less overt and covert anti-Semitism than in the past, 
which may have reduced the motivation to hide Jewish identity, or even increased the 
appeal of a Jewish identity for those who were both born within this tradition, and also 
born on the outside. 
With these demographic characteristics in mind, there are a few key reasons for 
the “Great Awakening” during the 1970s. Jonathan Sarna, one of the leading researchers 
on Jewish community and identity, notes three main explanations (1982). First, he 
mentions American Jewry’s reaction to liberalism in this decade. The 1960s brought 
immense radicalism to the social fabric, such as experimentation with drugs, heightened 
sexuality, and a fascination with Eastern religions, especially amongst youth. In reaction 
to this liberalism, some sought to reinstate some traditional practices, as a way to hold on 
to norms that many found more comfortable and sensible. A second explanation for this 
revival stems from a desire to search for meaning, direction and truth. In this period of 
uncertainty, many people were drawn to religion and religious figures, those “seemingly 
resistant to change” (1982:3). Indeed, turning to a religion with deep historical roots 
could anchor many who felt uneasy about the current conditions. Lastly, this resurgence 
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of Judaism may be a part of the assimilation/tradition cycle. That is, throughout Jewish 
history there have been periods of assimilation in secular society and times of turning 
inward towards strengthening the Jewish community (1982).  In the 1960s in America, 
Jews immersed themselves in the secular society as liberal values of freedom, equality, 
social justice, and interfaith dialogue coincided with mainstream society. However, as the 
1970s brought about tensions with Arab nations in the Middle East, Israeli wars brought 
anti-Semitism to the forefront, and a national economic crisis made it harder to rely on 
the government, Jewish values no longer aligned with the liberal values previously 
enumerated, and as such, Jews turned inward, lending itself to a restructuring and renewal 
of Jewish identity and community (1982). 
Even though all of American Jewry reformed during the 1970s, there were 
specific changes occurring amongst each religious denomination. To start, the Reform 
movement was founded in the 1840s as a direct reaction against Orthodoxy, aiming to 
practice a reformed Judaism in the secular world instead of staying within the religious 
community (Hyer 1973). Some examples of these changes included some services being 
held on Sundays instead of the traditional Sabbath day of Saturday, boys being 
discouraged from wearing kippas, or head coverings, and the introduction of a 
confirmation ritual for teenagers, sometimes in lieu of a Bar/Bat Mitzvah. During the 
1970s, however, as Jews turned toward tradition, the Reform movement was losing 
membership as it had a “disdain for tradition”, especially compared to the other sects 
(Sarna 1982). Thus, in November 1973, many key Reform and Conservative religious 
leaders and members met to discuss issues within their movements and strategies to turn 
its reputation around (Hyer 1973). As a consequence to this and other conferences, the 
movement garnered a greater respect for traditions and reintroduced some key ones back 
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into its practice, such as men wearing kippas, a skullcap, and a talit, prayer shawl 
(Schulman 2002).   
Unlike the Reform movement that had a clear mission to dissociate from 
Orthodox traditions, the Conservative movement started out as a split from Reform in 
1913, and served as a middle ground in between the two sects: conserving tradition while 
working within the secular framework where many Jews found themselves embedded 
(Hyer 1973). Indeed, Conservative leaders aimed to truly define their movement as its 
own entity and not just sandwiched vaguely in between the other two denominations. For 
example, Conservative temples would meet on Saturdays, the customary day of rest, but 
would have mixed co-ed seating so that families could sit together, unlike traditional 
Orthodox temples that have separate seating. Some of the most important changes that 
were implemented during this time included stricter interpretations on religious practice, 
a strong emphasis on supporting the state of Israel, and expanding the role of women in 
all aspects of synagogue life, including as Rabbis (Hyer 1973). The movement 
endeavored to make their goals clear, and even came out with a revised Statement of 
Principles of Conservative Judaism in 1988 (Ferziger 2012). 
The Orthodox movement changed least of all during this time, because while the 
other movements were striving to connect back to particular types of tradition, even 
though there were sometimes heated debates about practices in different streams of 
Orthodoxy, there was also a high degree of consensus (e.g. about liturgy, frequency of 
prayer and study, and how to keep Shabbat, kashrut, and laws of family purity). Indeed, 
in 1968 Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein, a prominent New York City Orthodox Rabbi, 
emphasized the necessity to adhere to Jewish law in everyday life (Ferziger 2012). 
Furthermore, Rabbi Aaron Kotler, a New Jersey Rabbi, highlighted that learning Torah is 
the most important thing an individual can do to sustain a Jewish identity (Ferziger 
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2012). Thus, the already-Orthodox community continued to largely replicate practices 
associated with preceding generations while other denominations started selectively 
applying more of this tradition back into their customs. 
Although the Orthodox movement did not implement any major changes into its 
own doctrines, it did need to respond to the growing number of Jewish individuals 
wishing to tap into the Orthodox lifestyle. To expand, the 1970s saw a huge resurgence of 
Baale Teshuva, Hebrew for ‘one who returns’(Sarna 1982). Some of these individuals 
wanted to alter their entire lifestyle while others just wanted to learn Jewish topics. Even 
Bob Dylan became interested in Orthodoxy for a bit and studied at a Yeshiva, a school 
for Judaic studies (Sarna 1982). Indeed, Sarna calls Baale Teshuva “the most visible 
component of the contemporary Jewish revival”(1982:31). Rabbi Schneerson, the head of 
the Chabad Chasidic movement from 1951-1994, stressed the importance of including all 
kinds of Jewish people in the community regardless if their background was Orthodox or 
not (Ferziger 2012). 
As each denomination reinstated traditional and religious practices in their own 
way, all of American Jewry collectively transformed with respect to their burgeoning 
support of Zionism and their relationship to the state of Israel. After the extermination of 
6 million Jews during World War II, many Holocaust survivors and other Jews—some of 
whom had been anti-Zionist in the pre-War years-- established a safe haven from anti-
Semitism and persecution by founding Israel in 1948.  Even though these new Israelis 
were hoping for a peaceful refuge, every decade brought new wars over the land with 
Israel’s Arab neighbors such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (Borstelmann 2012). 
In 1967, to the world’s surprise, Israel defeated all its neighbors in six days. On Yom 
Kippur 1973, the holiest fast day for Jewish people, Egypt and Syria surprise-attacked 
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Israel once again and almost defeated the nation. Yet again, the war ended in an Israeli 
victory (Borstelmann 2012). 
These wars, in addition to the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre of 11 
Israeli Olympians, and the 1976 plane hijack of Israelis that led to a rescue-raid mission 
in Entebbe, Uganda, ignited American Jews to be supportive of Israel. In 1975, when the 
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Zionism was a form of 
racism, Patrick Moynihan, the United States ambassador at the time, defended Israel by 
vehemently disagreeing with the UN’s resolution (as quoted in Borstelmann 2012:200). 
Indeed, Moynihan’s declaration marked a transition for all Americans; once being anti-
Semitic and viewing Jews as passive victims of the Holocaust, now they had respect for 
Israel for surviving against all odds, as well as towards Israelis as pioneers, no longer just 
survivors, in rebuilding a new land (Borstelmann 2012). Consequently, Jews became 
more accepted in political, economic, and cultural centers of power, which may have 
reduced the motivation for Jews to subdue their Jewish identity, and could have even 
increased the identity for those born within the tradition. Likewise, Rabbi Alexander M. 
Schindler, head of the organization of Reform Jewish synagogues, said that many 
American Jews had been ''plugged into Israel as if it were a kidney machine, a scientific 
marvel that ke[pt] them Jewishly alive” (as quoted in Briggs 1982). 
Aside from denominational shifts and pro-Israel sentiments, there were several 
other ways that Jews engaged with this transformation. Sarna notes that, “across the 
spectrum of Jewish life, new interest in tradition and ritual manifest[ed] itself” (1982:2). 
Indeed, questions of Jewish identity, the struggles with assimilation, and strategies to 
reconnect with roots persisted regardless if a Jew belonged to the Reform, Conservative, 
or Orthodox sect of Judaism (1982). In an effort to engage and educate youth, as well as 
to maintain the revival spirit, many new initiatives quickly gained in popularity. By 1980, 
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around 500 Jewish Day Schools flourished across the country (Hyer 1973). Attending 
Jewish sleep-away summer camps also continued to be popular throughout the 1970s. 
Although camps ranged in denominational affiliation, location, and size, the vast majority 
made “Judaism and Jewishness a norm of the camp experience” (Prell n.d.:7). These 
camps allowed Jewish youth to come together for a few months over the summer to not 
only socialize amongst their own ethnic group but also connect to Jewish tradition in 
ways that some may not get exposure to at home or in their school setting. 
Interestingly enough, the demand for kosher food has been directly impacted by 
the rise of religiosity by this baby boomer generation (Prashant et al 2003; Diamond 
2002). The WWII generation associated kosher foods with old world tastes, whereby 
gravitating towards gefilte fish and stuffed cabbage for their meals. Yet, once the baby 
boomers shopped for themselves, this more affluent generation demanded a wider variety 
of kosher food products. Moreover, kosher-adherent Jews wanted to “express their 
upwardly mobile tastes within a religiously permissible framework” (Diamond 
2002:491). Even cookbooks recognized this return to keeping kosher, and produced more 
kosher-friendly recipes (Roth 2010). Additionally, the creation of kosher TV dinners and 
instant cake mixes enabled this generation to have more flexibility when it came to 
kosher cooking, which enhanced the overall adoption of these practices (Diamond 2002).   
By the 1970s, more gourmet kosher foods and experiences were in demand, and 
kosher wine production expanded beyond the sweet taste of Manicheweitz, which 
resulted in wineries winning several awards. Indeed, by 1994, kosher wine sales were up 
to 365,000 cases per year (Diamond 2002).  Similarly, by the 1980s, kosher hotels and 
cruise lines were created to give the kosher consumer an opportunity to live luxuriously 
while still adhering to their religious practices (Diamond 2002). 
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Throughout the 1970s, American Jews experienced changes across many fronts. 
Each denomination was affected by the instability permeating American society during 
this decade and responded in its own way. As described above, the Reform movement 
reintroduced practices that were previously abandoned, the Conservative movement made 
strides towards defining their role in the community, and Orthodoxy excitedly embraced 
the individuals who wanted to reconnect to the traditions they held dear (Ferziger 2012).  
Most importantly, however, Jews transcended their denominations as they were able to 
unite in terms of their attitudes towards Israel and their general support of Zionism. 
American Jews not only provided financial and philosophical support, but thousands of 
Jews visited and moved to Israel to connect with their Jewish homeland (O’Neil 1980). 
Indeed, the 1970s Jewish revival enabled individuals and denominations alike to 
strengthen their Jewish identity in various ways, with an underlying appreciation for the 
traditions laid forth in Jewish texts and history. 
This renewal has affected the American Jewish community today. The 2013 Pew 
Portrait of Jewish Americans Survey (described in greater detail below) indicated that the 
Baby Boomer generation--- those that lived through the 1970s and born between 1946 
and 1964-- still strongly identify with Judaism (2013). To elaborate, 81% of these Jews 
consider themselves Jews by religion, and only 19% consider themselves Jews of no 
religion, indicating that the vast majority of this Jewish cohort still identifies with the 
traditions they were socialized into forty years prior. 
In contrast, overall levels of engagement are much lower for the younger 
generation. The Millennial generation, born after 1980, does not associate with Judaism 
in a religious sense nearly as much as the baby boomers (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 
2013). Only 68% consider themselves Jews by religion and 32% consider themselves 
Jews of no religion. This is consistent with other research. Rebhun compared Jewish 
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identification from 1970 to 1990 and concluded that although intermittent and home-
bound traditions have been quite stable over time, persistent and communal religious 
behavior has dramatically declined (2004). Comparatively, in 2012, Ukeles compared 
four active, long-established, and large Jewish Communities-- Chicago, Baltimore, New 
York, and Cleveland--  and concluded that in these communities there is a strong overall 
engagement in Judaism, yet with important group exceptions such as Jews who identify 
as no religion, those who have intermarried, and non-Orthodox young adults (2012). 
These findings illustrate the demographic strength of the Orthodox community, as they 
are not only growing in size but are also remaining active participants in the community 
(Ukeles 2012). Additionally, Ukeles finds that there are a growing number of Jewish 
families living in poverty, and the high cost of belonging to Jewish institutions hinders 
the engagement opportunities of Jews in poverty and young adults (2012). Congruently, a 
2013 study found a lack of engagement by young adults in all religious or traditionally 
Jewish institutions, with only a small number belonging to a temple or going to services 
(Shain et. al. 2013). 
What this study also found, however, is an emergence of “Do it Yourself” 
Judaism by a small segment of the young adult population. Forty-two percent of the 
roughly 1,300 sample engaged in DIY Judaism, whereby participating in “home-based or 
self-organized ritual practice and small, niche initiatives” such as hosting a Shabbat 
dinner or holiday party (Shain et. al. 2013:15). Those with no Jewish background do not 
even engage on this organic level, but those with somewhat of a Jewish background 
participated the most in DIY Judaism. In contrast, Jews who identify with a stronger 
background do activities that extend beyond DIY Judaism.  
There are few key factors that affect this low level of engagement and weakened 
sense of Jewish identity. Most importantly, an examination of the Pew data reveals that 
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there have been major shifts in denominational affiliation over time, which bears with it 
some unique implications. More than 50% of Conservative Jews move to some other 
stream of Judaism at one point in their lives. Specifically, in 1971, 41% of Jews aged less 
than 30 identified as Conservative compared to only 11% of Jews under thirty today (A 
Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013; Gordis 2014). Around 60% of Orthodox, Reform, 
and Secular/Cultural groups remain in the same stream as their childhood affiliation (own 
calculation). Hartman and Hartman also discovered a very similar movement (1999). 
They assert that for individuals who move from a less traditional denomination to a more 
traditional one, perhaps from Reform to Orthodoxy, there will be a rededication effect to 
the movement and the individual's religious and ethnic identities will get stronger (1999). 
In contrast, those who go from a more traditional background to a less traditional one will 
retain an influence from their previous denomination, and will more strongly identify 
with Judaism than their counterparts in this new stream (Hartman and Hartman 1999). 
Finally, Sands, Marcus, and Danzig discovered that a lower level of Jewish background, 
trips to Israel, levels of organizational affiliation, and higher levels of spirituality are 
associated with moving to more traditional denominations (2006). In addition, being 
previously married, having a child in one’s home, and living in the Western region of the 
United States also contribute to moving to more traditional denominations. In contrast, a 
higher level of Jewish background, fewer trips to Israel, and lower level of spirituality are 
associated with moving to a less traditional denomination (Sands, Marcus, Danzig 2006). 
Furthermore, they found that individuals who are older, women, and living in the South 
or Midwest, makes one more likely to move to less traditional denominations. Clearly, 
the conversion and denominational switching phenomenon occurs in all directions and 
across all groups of Judaism. 
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One theory behind these shifts is that, as individuals age, they adopt different 
types of identities, specifically from religious to cultural. Over time, Jewish identity has 
shifted from focusing mainly on religious traditions to integrating ethnic and cultural 
measures into this framework. Indeed, many American Jews solely identify with the 
ethnic identity that ties in Jewish history and ancestry together (Friedlander et. al. 2010). 
Ganz’s study on Jews in the 1950s notes this symbolic ethnicity, theorizing that Jews will 
weaken their attachment and behaviors towards religion and instead identify with the 
symbols of Judaism, only passively engaging in the religion (Ganz 1956). He believed 
that, like immigrants, Jews will shed this religious identity and connect to other ethnic 
identities in America, resulting in a lack of actual effort made to maintain Judaism. Fifty 
years later, Hartman and Hartman acknowledge that part of this phenomenon still exists, 
whereby Jews acknowledge ethnic, historic, and cultural components of identity in 
addition to religion, which leads to the nuanced expression of Jewish identity in both the 
public and private domains (2009). Likewise, Kivisto and Nefzger(1993) have connected 
ethnic and religious identities together, noting the uniqueness Jews to connect to a 
religion and ethnicity, especially compared to other white groups. Thus, they note that 
Jewish identity may have changed “qualitatively, not quantitatively”, such that Jews are 
redefining the various identities one can develop in regards to Judaism (ibid p.6). 
Although a change in identity typology as well as denominational shifts have 
contributed to decreased levels of engagement, the rise of intermarriage undoubtedly 
plays a role in this phenomenon. The Pew study revealed that only 59% of children with 
intermarried parents ages 18-29 identify with Judaism, and it is projected that 83% of this 
same group who chooses to marry will wind up marrying non-Jews (2013). This group is 
also half as likely to be involved in the Jewish community, raise Jewish children, identify 
with Israel, or affiliate with a Jewish denomination compared to people with two Jewish 
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parents (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013). Similarly, intermarriage has shifted 
Jewish identity entirely, such that affiliation is now seen as a choice (Friedlander et. al. 
2010). Because intermarried couples have two religious identities at play, people are 
identifying with Judaism as they see fit, and disregarding the traditional notion that either 
matriline or conversion are the necessary determinants of a Jewish identity. Thus, 
because intermarriages breeds more acceptance of outgroups and weakens prejudices and 
stereotypes, this could lead to someone choosing to identify with outgroups they may 
have been less likely to want to identify with before marriage (Kalmijn 1998). 
Along these lines, intermarried relationships have a higher level of divorce than 
in-marriage relationships (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). With the exception of couples 
with no religious identification, people who identify with the same religions have more 
stable and long relationships, and relationships are hindered when partners need to look 
elsewhere for religious intimacy (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). However, marriage 
scholars have noted that individuals endogamous and homogamous, marrying people 
within their group and with the same status, respectively (Kalmijn 1998). Jews, on 
average, are less likely to divorce than other populations, and thus, intermarriages within 
the Jewish population are also less likely to get divorced, despite their mismatched 
identities (Rebhun 2004b, Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). One explanation to this is that 
non-Jews who live with Jews are more likely to honor the Jewish faith and be engaged in 
Jewish rituals and ceremonies, even if they maintain their own religious faith (Rebhun 
2004b). However, despite this engagement, Jewish intermarried couples are still less 
likely to raise their children Jewish and participate in the Jewish community. 
Beyond familial composition, research has identified two factors, the importance 
of communal institutions and home-bound rituals, which affect Jewish identity. 
Participating in Jewish institutions has undoubtedly been linked to an increased Jewish 
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identity. Kivitso and Nefzger’s research concluded that the importance of being Jewish 
has a significantly positive correlation to Jewish behaviors and participation (1993). 
Likewise, participating in life transitions with and through the community, such as Bar 
and Bat Mitzvahs at a temple or “sitting Shiva” (a ritualized period of mourning after the 
death of a close family member), and having visitors inextricably links Jewish identity to 
the community (King 2003). Several studies have noted that youth group participation 
has been positively linked with ritual observance, in-marriage, and involvement and 
membership in Jewish institutions and the Jewish people (Cohen and Ganapol 1998; 
Hartman and Hartman 2003; Baker and Ukeles 1994). Steven M. Cohen concludes that 
Jewish education leads to having more Jewish friends later in life, and that a Jewish 
identity is associated with having more religious and social Jewish contacts (Cohen 2007; 
Amyot and Sigelman 1996). Furthermore, the more Jewish education a child has, the 
stronger their Jewish identity will be as adults, resulting in a higher rate of in-marriage as 
well (Cohen 2007). However, interestingly enough, attending Sunday school or part-time 
Jewish school does not have an effect on a child unless Jewish norms taught in school are 
enforced at home (Cohen 1974). Second only to attending Jewish day schools, trips to 
Israel have the strongest long-term impact on Jewish identity (Cohen 2007). Most 
importantly, Kress and Elias found that the level of commitment to Judaism for students 
in their study depended on the number of Jewish communal contexts as well as family 
and home-bound rituals that the student participated in (n.d.). 
We understand the importance of participating in Jewish institutions on Jewish 
identity, but how is that identity affected by the mere presence of different types of 
Jewish institutions? This has yet to be analyzed (Kress and Elias n.d.). Herein lies one of 
the key motivations for the present study. While paying heed to the effects of religious 
economies in general and intermarriage, I pose several questions on the role of Jewish 
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institutions on different aspects of Jewish identity. How does the number of Jewish 
institutions in one’s community affect identity formation? Does this affect one’s religious 
and cultural identities in different stages of one’s life, or is identity fully formed in 
adolescent and young adulthood like the previous research suggests? How has having 
intermarried parents impacted an individual’s identity if this individual lives in areas with 
Jewish institutions? Taken altogether, how is reported Jewish identity affected by 
institutions, especially in combination with other indices of identity, such as the presence 
of other religious institutions in the area, age, intermarriage, having visited Israel, and 
most importantly, the measured effect on identity when spatial models are specified. 
 
PRELIMINARY IMPRESSIONS: NLSY AND GSS 
For a preliminary glimpse of trends in Jewish identity in the U.S., I drew on 
Jewish samples from two nationally representative datasets: the National Longitudinal 
Study of Youth (NLSY 1979 and 1997), and the General Social Survey (GSS) . 
At first glance, the NLSY dataset is advantageous because it follows the same 
people over time, which affords researchers the opportunity to examine change in one’s 
lifetime, instead of generalizing trends across repeated cross-sectional samples, as is the 
case with the GSS. Additionally, the target age range for the NLSY at the baseline is 14-
22, which is a salient age for identity formation in some frameworks, and thus, we can 
measure trends for youth in their teens and twenties (Erikson 1982; Phinney and Alipuria 
1990; Waterman 1999). Interestingly, both models note that there is as much movement 
from a Jewish religious identity to another religious identity in the early years (1979-82) 
that data was collected as in the following 18 years (1982-2000). This finding strengthens 
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the claim that it is important to focus on adolescents and young adults, as these shifts in 
identity are occurring in significant levels during these ages. 
For our purposes, however, there are serious problems with the NLSY. One is 
related to available questions. Respondents were only asked a question on religious 
identity in 1979, 1982, and 2000 (see Figure 1). There is therefore no way to identify 
cultural identity, let alone qualitative measures of different types of identity (e.g. strength 
of affiliation). Another, problem is sample size and attrition. Of 117 Jewish participants 
in the 1979 baseline—already a small sample-- 51 were lost to attrition by 1980, and 
among those followed, a little less than 80% of those who claimed to have been raised 
Jewish still identified as Jewish, 12% claimed no religious identity, and 8% were 
associated with other religious traditions by the year 2000. People raised as Jews are less 
likely to fall out of the study than other participants in the sample. However, because we 
cannot measure these 51 Jewish people in 2000, it is unclear whether they are more likely 




Figure 1: Religious Identity in NLSY 1979 Jewish Sample  
Preliminary glimpse of trends can also be found in the 1997 NLSY panel. 
Although this sample is also limited, it asked respondents to name their denominational 
affiliation, allowing me to identify patterns of movement between different Jewish 
denominations. Of the 77 respondents in the 1997 NLSY sample who reported their 
childhood religion as Jewish, there are 22 respondents who identify with the Orthodox 
movement. By 2004 and 2011, 8 out of the 15 remaining participants reported an 
Orthodox affiliation, the largest affiliation identity. For Conservative denominational 
affiliation, there were 14 respondents in 1999, there were 6 in 2004 (out of 11, 3 were lost 
to sample attrition), and there were no Conservative respondents by 2011, (out of 4, as 10 
participants were lost to sample attrition). Lastly, in 1999 there were 28 Reform 
respondents, and by 2004 there were 7 (14 lost to sample attrition), and by 2011 there 
were 4 Reform respondents out of the remaining 13 (another 15 lost to sample attrition). 
Assuming that respondents lost to attrition had generally similar patterns of 
switching, these trends confirm the magnitude of movement between denominations over 
time. There are stronger signs of retention within Orthodoxy compared with the other 
denominations, which stayed consistent from 2004 to 2011. This is consistent with the 
literature that Orthodox adherents are less likely to switch denominations than other 
streams of Judaism (Ukeles 2012; see Figure 1). An interesting age pattern also emerges 
strongly in these data. The largest shifts across denominations occur from 1999 to 2004. 
This is strinkingly parallel to patterns found in the 1979 NLSY panel. It confirms that 
identities change more at an earlier age than an older one, so as these respondents get 
older, they are more likely to remain in the same denomination. 
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Altogether, the NLSY data supports the notions that Jewish identity is shifting 
both between and within groups, especially for younger people. However, this dataset has 
such a small sample that it hinders the generalizability of these findings. Furthermore, 
identity questions in this sample do not differentiate between religious and cultural 
measures, sample sizes restrict robust analysis of shifting from one stream or 
denomination to another, or from one religious tradition to another. 
General Social Survey (GSS) data allow me to parse out any aspects of Jewish 
identity in a somewhat different way. Respondents in this repeated cross-sectional sample 
were asked a question on religious identity in most years of the survey: 1982, 1983, 
1985-1991, 1993-2012.  They are also drawn from a much broader age range, allowing 
me to test the idea—related to identity formation theory reviewed above—that identity 
changes are more likely in late adolescence/early adulthood. Lastly, the GSS is beneficial 
in that it is a nationally representative sample, and can better suggest trends on a 
population level instead of an individual level such as the NLSY. 
Out of the 1,025 people in the pooled GSS sample who were raised Jewish at age 
16 and currently identify as Jewish in the GSS sample, a slight shift can be seen with 
regard to Jewish identity across the United States. Within this sample, there has been a 
15-20% disaffiliation rate with Judaism, with the greatest disaffiliation rate (20%) 
occurring in the years 2000-2006. This means that, over time, roughly 160 people from 
the sample have disaffiliated with Judaism. Of these people, nearly twice as many (N= 
102) who were raised Jewish have chosen to disaffiliate from any religion whatsoever, 
compared to people who were raised Jewish (N=60) who have affiliated, or converted, to 
another religion. I also grouped the respondents by age: those less than 40, those aged 
between 40-59, and those above 60. This data suggests that the greatest disaffiliation 
rates occur amongst the youngest age group and the lowest disaffiliation rate is amongst 
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the oldest age group. This is broadly consistent with past research that points to Jews 
under 40 as the critical targets for shifting identity. 
Taken together, therefore, both the NLSY and GSS show that there is movement 
across denominations, and a decline in self-identifying as Jewish. Although this shift is 
important, this data cannot parse out important details, such as why identity is changing, 
what type of people are changing, at what point in life stages Jewish identity changes the 
most, and which aspects of identity-- cultural or religious-- change the most.  
Furthermore, even in the NLSY sample, questions about identity were solely religious in 
nature (i.e. attending services and hours spent volunteering and participating in religious 
organizations), so it failed to capture a more nuanced approach to Jewish identity which 
includes cultural measures. 
It is important to note, however, that these denominational shifts, as seen in this 
preliminary data analyses, must not be examined in a Jewish bubble. Jewish Americans 
are operating in a religious marketplace, as communities across the country boast a wide 
range of religious institutions and practices. Thus, Jewish identity cannot only be defined 
by one’s label or identity with a particular Jewish denomination, but rather as a product 
of what other religious opportunities, identities, and labels are available in the greater 
community that an individual lives in. 
Indeed, the United States is unlike most other Western nations when it comes to 
religious freedom. Unlike in Europe, where a national church tends to dominate the local 
religious economy, the United States is intentionally heterogeneous in terms of religion. 
Furthermore, the value placed on multiculturalism, and the prolific mix of religions in 
communities, especially urban ones, makes possible the ability to access other groups and 
promote a central legitimacy of religious choice. This ideology enables religious shifts-- 
both inter-denominational as well as across religions-- to be acceptable, because there are 
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a range of choices unlike before and particular to the United States. Likewise, by coming 
into contact with these groups and peoples within them, it is easy for intermarriage to 
occur. 
Consequently, Jewish identity in the U.S. relies heavily on the general religious 
marketplace, or the religious economy, that Jews are embedded within, as a contributing 
factor not only to shifts in identity but also to increased levels of intermarriage over time. 
This idea of religious economy is a contributing factor to justify the examination of the 
effect of religious community institutions, both Jewish and non-Jewish, on one’s 
religious and cultural Jewish identities. As described below, I do this by pairing data on 
Jewish institutions and the general (i.e., non-Jewish) religious economy with individual-
level data from the 2013 Pew Portrait of Jewish Americans (PPJA) sample. This 
generates a much larger and generalizable sample of Jews across the United States that 
includes multiple measures of identity. 
Thus, these datasets are merely a baseline for further analysis that will be 
conducted in the Pew dataset. Indeed, to get a better measure of Jewish identity that 
measures both religious and cultural indicators, the Pew, conducted in 2013, which 
captures roughly 5,100 participants, is a more robust dataset to rely on to delve into the 






  The PPJA survey, fielded in 2013, includes 5,153 respondents who either self-
identify as Jews now, or as having been raised with at least one Jewish parent. Table 1 
presents some basic sociodemographic information about this sample. Gender is evenly 
distributed, with males representing 49.3% (n=2,542) and females representing 50.7% 
(n= 2,611). The mean age for the sample is 54.5 years old, with a range from 18 years old 
to 95 years old. Approximately 60% of the sample is married, 5% is living with a partner, 
10% is divorced or separated, and 16% has never been married.  Regarding education, 
around 65% of the sample has either an undergraduate and/or graduate degree, 20% has 
completed some college, and 14.5% has completed high school or less. Twenty-one 
percent of the sample earns over $150,000 a year, 33% earns between $75-150,000 a 
year, 22% earns between $40-75,000, and around the same, 23%, earns less than $40,000. 
Two variables are not as evenly distributed: regions where participants live and visiting 
Israel. Roughly 54% of the sample resides on the East Coast, 20% live in the South, 16% 
live in the West, and only 10% live in the Midwest. With regard to Israel, 55% of the 
sample has never visited Israel before, close to 18% has visited once, 26% has visited 
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    Visited Once 
    Visited > Once 
















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Measures 
In order to tap into the nuances of Jewish identity within the Pew dataset, I 
created two different scales to capture both religious and cultural aspects of Jewish 
 33 
behavior and attitudes. These scales are modeled after Ira Sheskin and Arnold 
Dashefskys’ 2011 Report on Jewish Population in the United States, and Harriet 
Hartman’s 2014 Berman Jewish DataBank Learning Module - Exploring Jewish Identity. 
Additional indicators of identity are denominational switching within Judaism and 
conversion into and out of Judaism. 
 
RELIGIOUS SCALE 
Using the following items in the Pew dataset, I generated an additive scale that 
represents religious Jewish identity. The scale ranges from 0-16, where 16 indexes 
greater religiosity (this required reverse coding of some of the variables): 
1. On observing Jewish Law: 
a. ‘q.E5c’ - Please tell me how important each of the following is to what 
being Jewish means to you observing Jewish law 
b. ‘q.H10’ - How often, if at all, does anyone in your household light 
Sabbath candles on Friday night? 
c. ‘q.H11a’ - Do you keep kosher in your home 
d. ‘q.H11b’ - Do you personally refrain from handling or spending money on 
the Jewish Sabbath 
e. ‘q.H11c’ - Last Passover, did you hold or attend a Seder or not? 
f. ‘q.H12’ - During the last Yom Kippur did you fast? 
g. ‘attend1’-  Aside from special occasions like weddings, funerals and bar 
mitzvahs, how often do you attend Jewish religious services at a 
synagogue, temple, minyan or Havurah ? 
h. ‘q.H6’ - Do you believe in God or a universal spirit or not ? 
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2. On self-identification 
a. ‘q.H5a’ - How important is religion in your life: very important, 
somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? 
3. On determining what it means to be Jewish 
a. a.‘q.E 6d’ - In your opinion, can a person be Jewish if they believe that 
Jesus was the messiah? 
  
CULTURAL SCALE 
To look at cultural Jewish identity, I followed the same procedures, this time 
using the following measures in the Pew dataset. Here, too, the final scale ranges from 0-
16: 
1. On self-identification: 
a. ‘finalqa4’- Aside from religion, do you consider yourself Jewish or 
partially Jewish, or not? 
b. ‘h5b’ - How important is being Jewish in your life: very important, 
somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? 
c. ‘q.E 9a’ - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I am proud to be 
Jewish 
d. ‘q.E 9b’ - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I have a strong sense 
of belonging to the Jewish people 
2. On Hebrew: 
a. ‘q.E7a-c’ Do you know the Hebrew alphabet, can you read Hebrew, can 
you converse in Hebrew? 
3. On determining what it means to be Jewish (seven items): 
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a. ‘q.E5a-i’- The importance of each of the following in determining what 
being Jewish means to you- remembering the Holocaust, having a good 
sense of humor, working for justice and equality in society, being 
intellectually curious, eating traditional Jewish foods, caring about 
Israel, being part of a Jewish community 
4. On Israel 
a. ‘q.G2-3b’ - How emotionally attached are you to Israel,  have you ever 
been to Israel, or not? have you been to Israel once or more than once? 
5. On participation in the context of others 
a. ‘h8c’- Is anyone in your household currently a member of any Jewish 
organizations other than a synagogue or temple, or not? 
b. ‘q.E 9c’ - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I have a special 
responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world 
c. ‘q.E11’- How many of your close friends are Jewish? Would you say all 
of them, most of them, some of them, or hardly any of them? 
 
Illustration 1 maps religious and cultural identities by zip code across the United 
States. I divided the religious and cultural scales into 1/3 in order to represent low (0-5), 
medium (6-10), and high (11-16) measures of identity. This figure supports the assertion 
that identity needs to be considered in these different religious and cultural frameworks, 
as identity of different types are found in different places in the country. Our analysis will 
add further strength to this claim as described below. 
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Illustration 1: Religious and Cultural Jewish Identity in the United States 
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DENOMINATIONAL SWITCHING 
The Pew study captured both participants’ childhood denomination identification 
and their current denomination identification. For childhood denomination, there are 731 
people who affiliated themselves with the Orthodox movement, 1,129 people with the 
Conservative, 1,070 Reform, and 914 who did not identify with any particular 
denomination. For current denomination, there are 550 people affiliating with Orthodoxy, 
905 with Conservative, 1,332 with Reform, and 1,532 with no denomination. I use a 
dichotomous dependent variable to identify differences between childhood and current 
denomination, with 1 indexing a different denomination, and 0 the same denomination. I 
also identify specific types of shifts: those who now self-identify as Orthodox but were 
something else as children; and parallel identifiers for those now self-identifying as 
Conservative or Reform. 
 
 
CONVERSION IN AND OUT OF JUDAISM 
As a final measure of identity, I use conversion into, and out of, Judaism. Here, 
too, I use two dichotomous variables. 866 respondents identified as converts into 
Judaism, by which I mean they currently identify as Jewish but report having two non-
Jewish parents. These individuals need not have had a formal conversion to be part of this 
group.  705 respondents are identified as converts out of Judaism. That is, they currently 
identify as non-Jewish, but report having two Jewish parents.  
 
As seen in Figure 2, there is an expected strong positive correlation between 
religious and cultural identities (r=0.69). However, they also confirm the lack of 
complete overlap, supporting my contention that identity is a multidimensional concept. 
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Figure 2: Correlation Table for Religious and Cultural Jewish Identity  
 
Explanatory Variables 
Three categories of explanatory variables are used. 
JEWISH INSTITUTIONS 
To analyze the correlation between Jewish cultural and religious identities and 
Jewish institutions available in communities across the United States, I compiled a 
comprehensive list of these institutions in the United States. These institutions include 
temples of all denominations (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, Reconstructionist), 
Chabad Houses, Hillels, Jewish Federations, Kosher restaurants, Mikvahs, schools of all 
types (part-time, day school, early childhood, yeshiva), summer camps (day camp and 
overnight camp), Jewish Community Centers, Jewish Philanthropies, Jewish Youth 
Groups, and Moishe Houses. Some of this information is available on public, online 
databases and were categorized by zip codes, which is ideal since the identity scales are 
also compiled by zip codes. To collect other information from every Jewish institution, I 
contacted representatives from the remaining organizations and was able to download 
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these datasets. Next, I combined these separate datasets and online information into one 
comprehensive dataset, totaling 9,594 institutions across the United States. Lastly, I 
coded the institutions by type of Jewish organization --cultural (1), cultural and religious 
(2), and religious (3) -- so that I could assess the impact and ascertain a more nuanced 
interaction between types of institutions and types of identity, though models leave open 
the possibility of cross-type effects. I combined all philanthropies, Jewish Community 
Centers, and Federations-- all cultural institutions-- into a single variable. 
Illustrations 2, 3, and 4 map Jewish Religious, Cultural, and Religious/Cultural 
(Both) institutions across counties in the United States, respectively. Just like the map of 
religious and cultural identities, it is clear that there are different quantities of these 
institutions found in different locations across the United States. Thus, it is important to 




Illustrations 2 and 3: Religious Institutions and Cultural Institutions in the United States 
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Illustration 4: Religious/Cultural Institutions in the United States 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Five distinct individual-level characteristics were used as controls, and were all 
grouped into four categories: education, income, age, current region of residence in the 
United States, and visiting Israel. Education levels were coded 1 to 4, indexing a high 
school degree or less, attending some college, completing college, and obtaining a 
graduate degree. Annual income levels were coded 1 to 4, indexing an annual income of 
less than $40,000, between $40-75,000, between $75-150,000, and above $150,000. Age 
groups were also coded 1 to 4, indexing ages 18-39, 40-59, 60-69, and 70-95. Regions of 
the country where one resides were also coded 1 to 4, indexing by East, Midwest, South, 
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West. Lastly, visiting Israel was coded 1 to 4, indexing never having visited Israel, visited 
Israel one time, visited Israel more than once, and lived in Israel. 
COUNTY-LEVEL RELIGIOUS ECONOMY DATA 
County-level control variables were used to capture contextual effects. This 
includes a 1-10 scale capturing the urban to rural environment, where higher numbers are 
more rural environments. Annual household income levels by county and percentage of 
residents with college degrees. All these are from the US Census Bureau. More directly 
relevant to the core theme of this paper are two indicators of general religious economies. 
These variables are the number of Christian churches by county, and the number of non-
Christian congregations by county. The source of this information came from the 





All data were merged into a single file by either ZIP code (Pew, Jewish 
institutions data) or FIPS/County code (US census data; non-Jewish religious insitutions). 
For each dependent variable, a series of models was then specified. The first model looks 
at the effects of individual sociodemographic characteristics on the identity scales. A 
second model adds three county-level socioeconomic and contextual control variables. 
Model three includes the two indicators of general (non-Jewish) religious economy. The 
fourth model adds two indicators of Jewish religious institutions: total number of 
synagogues in the same zip code; and the denomination range of synagogues in the zip 
code (0-5). The final model adds other Jewish insitutions: number of schools and camps 
per zip code, and total number of other institutions (Federations, JCCs, etc) per zip code. 
Initial models were fit using either OLS (0-16 identity scales) or logit approaches 
(denominational switching and conversion). In all cases, standard errors were controlled 




Results of the religious identity models are presented in Table 2. There is a 
significant negative correlation for all levels of education, such that the more educated 
one is, the less religious identity one reports. There is a negative effect of age on religious 
identity but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95 (-1.405, p<.05). 
Participants this age are statistically less religiously identifiable than people younger than 
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them. Furthermore, the West region has a lower religious identity than their counterparts 
on the East Coast (-1.405, p<.5). Lastly, although there is also a positive correlation 
between visiting Israel and religious identity, the strongest net effect is surprisingly when 
participants have visited Israel more than once, not lived there (5.054, p<.001 and 2.733, 
p<.05 respectively). There is also a negative effect of intermarried parents on religious 
identity (-1.058, p<.05). 
With respect to religious economy characteristics, the only significant findings is 
from Jewish institutions, such that the presence of Jewish schools, camps, and 
congregations have a significantly positive effect on religious identity, (0.102, p<.05 and 
0.0756, p<.001 respectively). Finally, the presence of non-Jewish congregations, as well 




Table 2: Main Variables’ Effect on Religious Identity 
 




















      
Education: Some 
college  
-0.969** -0.907* -0.899* -0.860* -0.704* 
 (0.340) (0.355) (0.357) (0.424) (0.347) 
Education: 
Undergraduate  
-1.390** -1.347** -1.351** -1.370** -1.112** 
 (0.434) (0.440) (0.443) (0.507) (0.397) 
Education: Graduate -2.388*** -2.204*** -2.206*** -2.090*** -1.820*** 
 (0.428) (0.443) (0.441) (0.520) (0.397) 
Annual Income: $40-
75K 
-0.386* -0.312++ -0.313++ -0.290++ -0.250 
 (0.182) (0.178) (0.179) (0.173) (0.177) 
Annual Income: $75-
150K 
-0.274 -0.214 -0.210 -0.286 -0.158 
 (0.277) (0.254) (0.253) (0.252) (0.237) 
Annual Income: >$150K -0.666 -0.369 -0.380 -0.424 -0.181 
 (0.428) (0.418) (0.404) (0.366) (0.333) 
Age Group: 40-59 -0.120 -0.0782 -0.0778 -0.199 -0.0287 
 (0.337) (0.320) (0.316) (0.277) (0.244) 
Age Group: 60-69 -0.650 -0.681 -0.674 -0.751++ -0.496 
 (0.488) (0.464) (0.455) (0.396) (0.344) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -1.405* -1.565** -1.551** -1.630** -1.267** 
 (0.553) (0.519) (0.517) (0.517) (0.444) 
Region: South -1.053* -0.918++ -1.056* -0.867* -0.550 
 (0.511) (0.545) (0.528) (0.410) (0.459) 
Region: Midwest -0.615++ -0.686* -0.773* -0.524++ -0.124 
 (0.336) (0.307) (0.317) (0.299) (0.267) 
Region: West -1.177** -1.332*** -1.244*** -0.939*** -0.896** 
 (0.366) (0.227) (0.269) (0.258) (0.272) 
Visited Israel: Once 1.325*** 1.310*** 1.315*** 1.163*** 1.111*** 
 (0.258) (0.263) (0.262) (0.305) (0.285) 
Visited Israel: > Once 5.054*** 4.916*** 4.920*** 4.518*** 4.225*** 
 (0.327) (0.328) (0.328) (0.319) (0.318) 
Visited Israel: Lived  2.733* 2.519* 2.558* 2.410* 2.407++ 
 (1.188) (1.208) (1.203) (1.133) (1.260) 
Native American 0.173 0.133 0.104 0.119 0.0959 
 (0.298) (0.287) (0.288) (0.277) (0.281) 
Intermarried Parents -1.058* -1.041* -1.059* -0.925* -0.744* 
 (0.457) (0.458) (0.461) (0.410) (0.362) 
Rural vs. Urban  -0.254* -0.224 -0.210 -0.0655 
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Table 2 (continued) 
  (0.116) (0.150) (0.140) (0.141) 
Annual Household  
 
Income 
 0.00655 0.00406 0.00540 0.00744 
  (0.00553) (0.00532) (0.00440) (0.00459) 
College degrees by 
county  
 -0.0723*** -0.0574** -0.0594*** -0.0614*** 
  (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0159) (0.0182) 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 






      
Presence of Non-
Christian Congregations 
  -0.320 -0.306 0.0274 
   (0.252) (0.222) (0.224) 
Presence of Jewish 
Congregations 




      
Presence of Chabad 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Orthodox 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Conservative 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Reform 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Jewish 
schools and camps 
    0.0756*** 
(0.0165) 
      
Presence of JCC, 
Federation, 
Philanthropies  
    -0.0377 
(0.117) 
      
Constant 8.426*** 9.650*** 8.024*** 8.357*** 7.973*** 
 (0.719) (1.218) (2.141) (1.789) (1.892) 
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Observations 4,403 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 
R-squared 0.332 0.347 0.348 0.374 0.394 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10 
 
Cultural Identity 
A different combination of characteristics explains variation in reported cultural 
identity --results are presented in Table 3. The four individual characteristics that have a 
significant effect on cultural identity are education, regions, visiting Israel1, and having 
intermarried parents. There is a negative effect of education on cultural identity, but it is 
only significant at the highest education level (-.568, p<.01). With regard to residing in 
different regions of the United States, compared to those living in the East, there is a 
significant negative correlation between living in the West, such that Jews living in the 
West have a lower cultural Jewish identity than Jews living in the East. Lastly, there is a 
positive correlation between visiting Israel and identity, such that the more times 
participants have visited or lived in Israel, the stronger their cultural Jewish identity 
becomes, especially for those who have lived there (1.685, p<.001, 4.084, p<.001, and 
4.842, p<.001 respectively). Lastly, having intermarried parents lowers one’s cultural 
identity (-1.188, p.<.001). 
Net of these individual-level characteristics, there is also a significant effect of 
living in a zip code with a range of temples and Jewish schools and camps on cultural 
identity. It should be noted that there is no significant effect of the presence of non-
Jewish congregation on Jewish cultural identity. 
 
                                                






Table 3: Main Variables’ Effect on Cultural Identity 





















      
Education: Some 
college  
-0.0818 -0.0555 -0.0503 -0.0523 -0.0128 
 (0.217) (0.225) (0.226) (0.226) (0.223) 
Education: 
Undergraduate  
-0.224 -0.226 -0.228 -0.254 -0.191 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.187) (0.204) (0.189) 
Education: Graduate -0.568** -0.491** -0.492** -0.444* -0.377* 
 (0.177) (0.182) (0.182) (0.197) (0.181) 
Annual Income: $40-
75K 
-0.220 -0.215 -0.216 -0.175 -0.164 
 (0.137) (0.142) (0.141) (0.130) (0.131) 
Annual Income: $75-
150K 
0.0150 -0.0135 -0.0113 -0.0380 -0.00710 
 (0.188) (0.182) (0.181) (0.178) (0.182) 
Annual Income: >$150K -0.204 -0.184 -0.193 -0.197 -0.137 
 (0.204) (0.203) (0.196) (0.191) (0.193) 
Age Group: 40-59 0.0512 0.0950 0.0954 0.100 0.140 
 (0.135) (0.128) (0.125) (0.119) (0.112) 
Age Group: 60-69 0.262 0.262 0.265 0.231 0.293++ 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.176) (0.169) 
Age Groups: 70-95 0.0593 0.0245 0.0329 0.00725 0.0965 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.206) (0.226) (0.220) 
Region: South -0.0163 0.0390 -0.0517 -0.000414 0.0698 
 (0.243) (0.252) (0.253) (0.214) (0.233) 
Region: Midwest -0.230 -0.317* -0.372* -0.273++ -0.183 
 (0.181) (0.147) (0.155) (0.155) (0.165) 
Region: West -0.401** -0.449*** -0.399*** -0.168 -0.157 
 (0.150) (0.120) (0.116) (0.133) (0.141) 
Visited Israel: Once 1.685*** 1.701*** 1.704*** 1.625*** 1.614*** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.114) (0.119) (0.119) 
Visited Israel: > Once 4.084*** 4.000*** 4.002*** 3.808*** 3.739*** 
 (0.167) (0.162) (0.162) (0.113) (0.118) 
Visited Israel: Lived  4.842*** 4.784*** 4.809*** 4.692*** 4.696*** 
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 (0.504) (0.517) (0.518) (0.491) (0.521) 
Native American 0.145 0.143 0.126 0.119 0.118 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.162) 
Intermarried Parents -1.188*** -1.182*** -1.192*** -1.123*** -1.077*** 
 (0.190) (0.195) (0.198) (0.173) (0.167) 
Rural vs. Urban 
community 
 -0.0458 -0.0216 -0.0262 0.00898 




 0.00313 0.00163 0.00206 0.00233 
Table 3 (continued) 
 
  (0.00246) (0.00246) (0.00230) (0.00294) 
College degrees by 
county  
 -0.0237*** -0.0142++ -0.0123 -0.0118 
     (0.00661) (0.00819) (0.00763) (0.00971) 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 
      0.247++ 
   (0.141) 
    0.185 
    (0.141) 
     0.121 
    (0.145) 
      
Presence of Non-
Christian Congregations 
  -0.205++ -0.242* -0.163 
   (0.106) (0.107) (0.117) 
Presence of Jewish 
Congregations 




      
Presence of Chabad 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Orthodox 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Reform 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Jewish 
schools and camps 
    0.0182** 
(0.00690) 
      
Presence of JCC, 
Federation, 
Philanthropies  
    -0.0241 
(0.0645) 
      
Constant 8.646*** 8.777*** 7.650*** 7.659*** 7.575*** 
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 (0.260) (0.458) (1.089) (1.053) (1.129) 
      
Observations 4,403 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 
R-squared 0.449 0.443 0.444 0.457 0.460 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10 
Movement In and Out of Denominations 
I set up my models to examine movement in and out of denominations, namely 
Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. By examining the movement between 
denominations from childhood to adulthood, one can glean some interesting effects of 
demographic, spatial, and contextual characteristics. 
As seen in Tables 4 and 5, there are significant effects for every single measured 
individual-level characteristic on moving into and out of these denominations. To begin, 
there is a negative effect of income on denominational switching. Participants in the 
highest income bracket, making over $150,000 a year, are the least likely to move both 
into the Orthodox denomination and the most likely to have left it2 (-1.815, p<.05 and -
1.109, p<.05, respectively).  
With regard to education, the only significant effect on moving into a 
denomination is with Orthodoxy, insofar as more education increases the likelihood of 
moving into this denomination, with an undergraduate degree being the most significant 
effect (2.075, p<.001 for undergraduate degree, 1.371, p<.05 for graduate degree). The 
only significant effect on moving out is with Conservative, such that the more educated 
participants are, the more likely they are to have moved out of this denomination.  
There is also a positive effect of age on moving into the Conservative and Reform 
denominations, but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95 (1.073, p<.01 
                                                
2 There are no other significant effects of income of moving into or out of Conservative or Reform 
denominations.  
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for Conservative and 1.033, p<.001, for Reform). The only significant result for moving 
out of a stream is for that of Orthodoxy. Compared to the youngest age group, the older 
one is, the more likely participants are to move out of the Orthodox denomination (1.381, 
p<.01, 1.971, p<.001, 2.552, p<.001, respectively)3.  
Pertaining to region, participants living on the South and Midwest regions are 
more likely to move into Orthodoxy, those in the South are significantly less likely to 
move into Conservative, and those in the Midwest are significantly more likely to move 
into Reform4. For movement out of denominations, the only significant result is that of 
participants living in the West, who are more likely to move out of Orthodoxy (1.577, 
p<.05). 
As for intermarriage, the only significant effect is for movement into 
Conservative, which has a positive effect if participants have intermarried parents (1.279, 
p<.001). Consistently, participants are less likely to move out of Conservative if they 
have intermarried parents (-0.503, p<.05). Strikingly, participants are more likely to move 
out of Reform if they have intermarried parents (0.556, p<.05). 
Lastly, in terms of visiting Israel, participants are less likely to have moved out of 
Orthodox streams if they visited Israel more than once, and almost significant if they 
lived there (-2.066, p<.001 and -1.461, respectively). Participants are also less likely to 
move out of Conservative if they visited Israel once or more than once (-.602, p<.001 and 
-.799, p<.001, respectively). Intriguingly, participants are less likely to move from 
Reform if they visited Israel once, but more likely to move out of Reform if they visited 
more than once (-.630, p<01 and 0.492, p<.05, respectively)5.  
                                                
3  There are no significant age effects for moving out of Conservative or Reform denominations.  
4 There are no significant effects on moving into denominations for the West region. 
5 No significant results for moving into a denominational stream. 
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With regard to spatial and religious economy characteristics for both Jewish and 
non-Jewish institutions, participants are less likely to move into the Orthodox stream if 
there are schools and camps in their area (-0.0784, p<.001), but there are no other 
significant findings for either Orthodoxy or the other two streams. With regard to moving 
out of a denomination,  participants are significantly less likely to move out of Orthodoxy 
if there is a presence of non-Christian congregations as well as a presence of Jewish 
schools and camps in their area (-0.779, p<.05 and -.0861, p<.001, respectively). The 
only other significant effect is for moving out of of the Reform denomination. 
Interestingly, the presence of Jewish congregations increases this movement out of the 
stream, however having a range of Jewish congregations makes participants less likely to 
move from the stream (0.237, p<.01 and -0.440, p<.01, respectively).  
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Table 4: Movement into Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Denominations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Move Into Reform 
    
Education: Some college 0.472 -0.208 0.499 
 (0.477) (0.296) (0.382) 
Education: Undergraduate  2.075*** -0.444 0.282 
 (0.515) (0.282) (0.305) 
Education: Graduate 1.371* -0.0217 0.408 
 (0.631) (0.357) (0.337) 
Annual Income: $40-75K -1.749* -0.359 0.00405 
 (0.763) (0.307) (0.269) 
Annual Income: $75-150K -0.639 -0.0902 0.211 
 (0.603) (0.332) (0.279) 
Annual Income: >$150K -1.815* -0.334 0.200 
 (0.739) (0.374) (0.254) 
Age Group: 40-59 0.581 0.503 0.0661 
 (0.470) (0.421) (0.243) 
Age Group: 60-69 -1.286 0.682++ 0.412 
 (1.038) (0.406) (0.251) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -1.310++ 1.073** 1.033*** 
 (0.712) (0.412) (0.266) 
Region: South 2.704*** -1.022* -0.138 
 (0.649) (0.472) (0.270) 
Region: Midwest 1.627** 0.112 0.370* 
 (0.505) (0.253) (0.188) 
Region: West -2.681 -0.325 -0.480++ 
 (1.852) (0.338) (0.286) 
Visited Israel: Once 0.132 -0.165 -0.120 
 (0.391) (0.287) (0.211) 
Visited Israel: > Once -1.169* 0.221 0.417 
 
Visited Israel: Lived 
(0.457) 
     -1.461++ 










Rural vs. Urban community 
 
Annual Household Income 
 

















































Presence of Jewish Congregations 0.0141 
(0.0129) 
  0.0394 






Table 4 (continued) 
 






         -0.0290 
          (0.126) 
-0.227++ 
(0.130) 
Presence of Jewish schools and 
camps 
 
Presence of JCC, Federation, 
Philanthropies 














   (0.0717) 







        -4.308* 
        (2.168) 
          -2.506 
          (1.599) 
Observations  743 736           1,293 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
























Table 5: Movement Out of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Denominations  
 (1) (2) (3) 




Move from Reform 
    
Education: Some college  -0.356           0.574 -0.250 
 (0.516) (0.361) (0.349) 
Education: Undergraduate  0.265 0.598++ -0.0179 
 (0.469) (0.357) (0.344) 
Education: Graduate 0.899 0.939** 0.207 
 (0.604) (0.360) (0.364) 
Annual Income: $40-75K 0.508++ -0.335 -0.0805 
 (0.302) (0.308) (0.317) 
Annual Income: $75-150K -0.322 -0.288 0.135 
 (0.404) (0.366) (0.295) 
Annual Income: >$150K -1.109* -0.0478 0.136 
 (0.478) (0.432) (0.256) 
Age Group: 40-59 1.381** -0.143 0.0421 
 (0.454) (0.242) (0.242) 
Age Group: 60-69 1.971*** -0.0348 0.125 
 (0.400) (0.304) (0.258) 
Age Groups: 70-95 2.552*** -0.323 -0.561 
 (0.397) (0.323) (0.425) 
Region: South 1.683++ 0.302 0.0382 
 (0.955) (0.400) (0.338) 
Region: Midwest 0.334 0.153 0.436++ 
 (0.648) (0.188) (0.250) 
Region: West 1.577* 0.102 0.459 
 (0.614) (0.242) (0.323) 
Visited Israel: Once -0.518 -0.602*** -0.630** 
 (0.418) (0.156) (0.229) 
Visited Israel: > Once -2.066*** -0.799*** 0.492* 
 (0.334) (0.217) (0.216) 
Visited Israel: Lived  -1.461++ -1.128 1.307 
 (0.810) (0.775) (1.213) 
Intermarried Parents 
 
Rural vs. Urban community 
 
Annual Household Income 
 


























Presence of Christian 
Congregations 
 
















(0.309) (0.199) (0.260) 
 








Table 5 (continued) 
 











Presence of Jewish schools and 
camps 
 
Presence of JCC, Federation, 
Philanthropies 














   (0.0887) 







        1.241 
      (1.825) 
          -0.588 
          (1.971) 
Observations  858 1,089           1,087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Denominations and Intermarriage 
In order to examine the effects of intermarriage on religious and cultural identity, 
I broke down not only childhood religious self-identification but also current religious 
self-identification by the three main streams of Judaism: Reform, Conservative, and 
Orthodox6. 
I initially needed to assess, of those who identify with these streams in their 
childhood, which people had two Jewish parents, and which people had one non-Jewish 
parent. In this sample of participants who were asked this question (N=3.459), 1,266 
were Reform in their childhood, 1,239 were Conservative, and 954 were Orthodox. 
Within the Reform denomination, 1,037 (82%) had two Jewish parents, and 229 (18%) 
had intermarried parents. Within Conservative, 1,135 (92%) had two Jewish parents, and 
104 (8%) had intermarried parents. Finally, within the Orthodox denomination, 880 
(92%) had two Jewish parents, and 74 (8%) had intermarried parents. 
I also broke down the Orthodox denomination into three main identifiers within 
this movement: Modern Orthodox, Hasidic, and Yeshivish. Of these groups, 96% 
(N=433) of Modern Orthodox people have two Jewish parents and 4% (N=17) have one 
Jewish parent and 98% (N=205) of Hasidic Orthodox people have two Jewish parents 
and 2% (N=5) have one. Interestingly, only 78% (N=147) of Yeshivish Orthodox people 
have two Jewish parents, whereas 22% (N=40) have only one Jewish parent. 
                                                
6 I did not look at participant’s intermarriage rates largely due to methodological reasons. The Pew Study 
did not ask for a date of marriage, marriage history, or religion/denomination of first spouse. In addition, 
since certain attitudes surrounding intermarriage may delay marriage, there is a selectivity issues in terms 
of who in the sample has a partner. Therefore, they did not ask through enough questions to establish a 
causal relationship between chances of getting married to a Jewish person. It is interesting to note, 
however, that having intermarried parents does not change one’s probability of getting married. In fact, we 
cannot tell what religion one’s spouse will be, but having intermarried parents does not affect the changes 
that one will get married at all. 
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Next, I ran this demographic information for current religious identification and 
intermarried parents. In this sample (N=4,394), 1,235 currently do not identify with any 
denomination, 1,482 identify with the Reform movement, 854 are Conservative, and 823 
are Orthodox. For non-denominational identification, 681 (55%) have two Jewish 
parents, yet 554 (45%) have intermarried parents. Within the Reform denomination, 
1,271 (86%) have two Jewish parents, whereas 211 (14%) have intermarried parents. 
Within Conservative, 737 (86%) have two Jewish parents, yet 117 (14%) have 
intermarried parents. Lastly, within Orthodox, 765 (93%) have two Jewish parents, and 
58 (7%) have intermarried parents. 
Once I was able to see these trends across denominations, I replicated these 
models to look for age effects. More specifically I wanted to see the effect of childhood 
denomination on the likelihood that one’s parents were intermarried. As seen in Figure 3, 
among those aged 18-39, more than 70% of those who reported no childhood 
denomination grew up in a mixed marriage. Equivalent percentages across denomination 
are 43% among those who reported growing up Reform, 16% among those who grew up 
Conservative, and 5% among those who grew up Orthodox. Indeed, trends vary 
significantly not only across denominations but also across age groups. There are signs of 
decline in the proportion of growing up in a non-denominational intermarried family 
across age groups, decelerating decrease for Reform, linear increase among Conservative, 
and stability among the Orthodox, with the exception of the large increase in likelihood 
for the 60-69 age group. This blip can be attributed to the surprising demographic 
characteristic of the Yeshivish community7. Likewise, there was no significant presence 
                                                
7 One hypothesis for this phenomenon could be the Baal Teshuvah movement that burgeoned in the 1970s, 
when this cohort was in their 20s. People who returned to Judaism had to engage in intensive study to 
familiarize themselves with traditions, and could potentially consider themselves “Yeshivish”, for they 
studied in Yeshivas during this time. However, because they did not grow up religious, they may be more 
likely to have intermarried parents. 
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of religious identity for this age group (see Table 2), so this may be correlated with their 
denominational affiliation. 
 
Figure 3: Childhood Denomination for Children of Intermarriage 
I also examined these age effects for one’s current denominational identification 
to see how they self-identify given that they grew up in an intermarried family. As seen 
in Figure 4, there are somewhat similar results from childhood denomination. For current 
denomination, among those aged 18-39, more than 70% of those who reported no current 
denomination grew up in a mixed marriage. For this same age group across 
denominations are 38% among those who report being Reform, 21% among those who 
are Conservative, and 3% among those who are Orthodox. In addition, there are signs of 
decline in the proportion of being in a non-denominational intermarried family across age 
groups, decelerating decrease for Reform, a linear and then decrease trend among 
Conservative, and an even larger increase than childhood denomination for the 60-69 age 
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group, of about 35% likelihood of having intermarried parents, compared to 25% chance 
for childhood denomination. 
 
Figure 4: Current Denomination for Children of Intermarriage 
In the second stage of this analysis, I ran a secondary set of models (see Appendix 
A) to measure interaction effects of intermarriage on the same core standardized 
characteristics that have been used in other models in this analysis. For religious identity 
for the 18-39 age group, having intermarried parents reduces one’s score on religious 
scale, or chances of a stronger religious identity, by 4.67 points (see Table 8). Indeed, the 
largest effect can be seen for this age group, although the there are still significant 
negative effects of intermarriage on religious identity for all other age groups. To expand, 
for participants aged 40-59, there is a 3.9 point reduction in religious identity, for the 60-
69 age group there is a 2.3 point reduction, and for the 70-95 age group there is a 4.1 
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point reduction in religious identity. Overall, the negatively significant effect is smaller 
for the older age groups, but only marginally smaller. 
In terms of cultural identity, there are some negative effects, but not for every age 
group (see Table 9). For cultural identity for the 18-39 age group, having intermarried 
parents reduces one’s score on the scale by 3.27 points. For participants aged 40-59, they 
see a reduction of 2.76 points, for the 60-69 age group there is a 1.87 point reduction in 
cultural identity, and the 70-95 age group does not have a significant effect, but still sees 
a 1.84 point reduction. Overall, just like religious identity, the 18-39 age group is the 
most negatively affected by having intermarried parents, which is the most alarming 
since this age group is the future generation of Jewish Americans. Moreover, although 
intermarriage has a negative affect for both aspects of identity, there is a stronger effect 
on religious identity than on cultural identity. 
With regard to education, all levels of education have a significantly negative 
result on religious identity. For children of intermarriages, the more education one 
receives, the less religious identity one will have. The largest effect can be seen for those 
with a graduate degree, who have a 6.4 point reduction in religious identity, compared to 
those with a high school degree or less, who have a 5.2 point reduction8. 
After examining region of the country where one lives, the only significant region 
affecting religious identity is the West, which has a 5.8 point reduction in religious 
identity. For cultural identity the West is also the only significant region, with a 3.9 point 
reduction in cultural identity. Once again, religious identity is affected more severely than 
education on children of intermarriages. 
                                                
8 No significant effects of education on cultural identity. 
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In the second model, I added visits to Israel to ascertain the effects of visiting 
Israel on children of intermarriages. For religious identity, there is a 1.28 point reduction 
in religious identity for participants who been to Israel once. However, the negative 
effects of intermarriage are diminished for those who have visited Israel more than once. 
To expand, there is a 2.11 increase in religious identity for those children of 
intermarriages who have visited Israel more than once. For cultural identity, the effects of 
visiting Israel are even stronger. For participants who have visited Israel once, their 
cultural identity increases by .063 points. For participants who have been to Israel more 
than once, this increases jumps to 2.43, and for those who have lived there it increases to 
3.15 points. Thus, visits to Israel dramatically increases one’s cultural identity and 
negates the negative effects of intermarriage on one’s identity, whilst also has a positive 
effect in some regard on religious identity. 
Lastly, in the third and final model I included religious economy characteristics, 
including the number of Christian churches, number of non-Christian congregations, and 
Jewish temples and schools. For religious identity, the presence of Christian churches 
reduces one’s religious identity by 1.47 points, and reduces one’s cultural identity by 1.03 
points. The presence of non-Christian congregations decreases the religious identity of a 
child of intermarriage by 2.5 points, and cultural identity by 1.55 points. With regard to 
the presence of Jewish temples in one’s community, there is a 1.9 point reduction in 
religious identity, and a 1.32 point reduction for cultural identity. Interestingly, whereas 
religious economy characteristics have been successfully proven in other models, the 
negative effects of intermarriage outweigh the potential benefits of living in a community 
with religious institution. Most importantly, parental intermarriage is highly correlated 
with key variables in this model. Therefore, this variables needs to be incorporated into 
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further analyses to see how Jewish institutions affect the religious and cultural identities 
of intermarried children. 
Conversion in and out of Judaism 
There are some interesting significant effects of conversion into and out of 
Judaism. To recall, conversion in refers to an individual who has two non-Jewish parents 
but who self-identifies as Jewish. In contrast, conversion out refers to an individual who 
had two Jewish parents but who now identifies as non-Jewish. 
First I analyzed the effects of individuals who have converted in. As seen in Table 
6, there is a negative effect of age, but it is only significant for the oldest categories, ages 
60-69 and 70-95 (-.532, p<.05 and -1.277, p<0.001, respectively). In terms of education, 
the more educated one is, the less likely they are to have converted in. Income only has a 
mild negative effect, such that with more money, individuals are slightly less likely to 
have converted in. As for region where one resides, an individual is more likely to have 
converted into Judaism in the Midwest and South than in the East coast. Intriguingly, 
participants are much less likely to convert into Judaism if one has visited Israel once, 
more than once, and even lived there, compared to if that individual has not visited Israel 
at all (-1.693, p<.001, -3.087, p<.001, -2.525, p<.001, respectively). Lastly, for religious 
economy characteristics, the more Christian congregations and Jewish congregations 
there are in one’s zip code, the more likely one is to convert in. In contrast, the more 
Non-Christian congregations there are, the less likely one is to convert in. Interestingly, 
the more Jewish schools there are in one’s community, the less likely one is to convert in. 
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Table 6: Main Variables’ Effect on Converting into Judaism  
 





















      
Education: Some 
college  
0.236 0.0403 0.0550 0.0904 0.0694 
 (0.256) (0.268) (0.257) (0.236) (0.227) 
Education: 
Undergraduate  
-0.677* -0.653* -0.693* -0.705** -0.718** 
 (0.275) (0.293) (0.291) (0.269) (0.254) 
Education: Graduate -0.788* -0.845* -0.847** -0.942** -0.979** 
 (0.322) (0.333) (0.328) (0.311) (0.300) 
Annual Income: $40-
75K 
0.215 0.0648 0.0908 0.113 0.0821 
 (0.169) (0.197) (0.203) (0.202) (0.195) 
Annual Income: $75-
150K 
-0.532* -0.421 -0.428 -0.416++ -0.448++ 
 (0.252) (0.275) (0.263) (0.233) (0.229) 
Annual Income: >$150K -0.543* -0.406 -0.383 -0.228 -0.305 
 (0.259) (0.297) (0.296) (0.263) (0.250) 
Age Group: 40-59 0.208 0.0609 0.112 0.183 0.0922 
 (0.242) (0.246) (0.239) (0.239) (0.234) 
Age Group: 60-69 -0.532* -0.432 -0.346 -0.291 -0.351 
 (0.270) (0.271) (0.265) (0.272) (0.268) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -1.277*** -1.188*** -1.140*** -0.948*** -1.040*** 
 (0.258) (0.264) (0.263) (0.250) (0.253) 
Region: South 0.516 0.604++ 0.454++ 0.440* 0.340++ 
 (0.339) (0.342) (0.272) (0.206) (0.195) 
Region: Midwest 0.800** 0.847** 0.655* 0.682** 0.523* 
 (0.295) (0.303) (0.273) (0.210) (0.223) 
Region: West 0.635* 0.714** 1.167*** 0.767*** 0.634*** 
 (0.266) (0.254) (0.217) (0.185) (0.171) 
Visited Israel: Once -1.693*** -1.560*** -1.516*** -1.375*** -1.306*** 
 (0.170) (0.172) (0.168) (0.157) (0.157) 
Visited Israel: > Once -3.087*** -2.987*** -2.972*** -2.757*** -2.604*** 
 (0.233) (0.246) (0.243) (0.267) (0.265) 
Visited Israel: Lived  -2.525*** -2.414*** -2.321*** -2.181** -2.085** 
 (0.668) (0.639) (0.666) (0.712) (0.719) 
Native American -0.452* -0.643*** -0.810*** -0.849*** -0.828*** 
 (0.201) (0.192) (0.187) (0.176) (0.178) 
Rural vs. Urban 
community 
 0.417*** 0.266*** 0.281*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0787) (0.0804) (0.0750) (0.0716) 
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 0.00108 -0.00710 -0.00385 -0.00648++ 
  (0.00533) (0.00526) (0.00367) (0.00341) 
College degrees by 
county 
 -0.0105 0.0241 0.0139 0.0211++ 
  (0.0108) (0.0155) (0.0119) (0.0127) 
 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 






      
Presence of Non-
Christian Congregations 






      
Presence of Jewish 
Congregations 




      
Presence of Chabad 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Orthodox 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Reform 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Jewish 
schools and camps 
    -0.0571* 
(0.0258) 
      
Presence of JCC, 
Federation, 
Philanthropies 
    -0.235 
(0.156) 
      
Constant 0.232 -0.0946 0.258 0.0216 0.647 
 (0.490) (1.407) (1.581) (1.390) (1.251) 
      
Observations 3,935 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824 
As for converting out, the age pattern is much less pronounced. As seen in Table 
7, elderly people are still less likely to have converted out, but with a much smaller effect 
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than individuals who converted in (-.471, p<0.001, compared to -1.277, p<0.01). Similar 
to converting in, the most educated group is much more likely to have converted out. 
There are no income effects for individuals who converted out. For region where one 
lives, an individual is much more likely to convert out if they live in the West coast, but 
there are no other regional effects. This is consistent with the research on religious 
movement, as the West coast is the region with the most religious movement. There is a 
significant negative effect for visiting Israel, with the greatest effect seen if one has lived 
in Israel (-.0775, p<.001, -1.698, p<.001, -1.828, p<.001, respectively). As such, 
participants are much less likely to convert out of Judaism if they have visited Israel even 
once, and especially less likely if they have lived there.  
As for religious economy characteristics, there are almost the same marginal 
effects as seen with converting in: the more Christian congregations there are, the more 
likely one will convert out, but the more Non-Christian congregations there are, the less 
likely one will convert out (.327, p <.05 and -.408, p <.05 for converting out; .360, p <.05 
and -.482, p<.01 for converting in). In addition, just like converting in, the more Jewish 
schools and camps there are in one’s community, the less likely one is to convert in. 
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Table 7: Main Variables’ Effect on Converting out of Judaism  





















      
Education: Some 
college  
0.533* 0.505++ 0.521++ 0.504++ 0.474++ 
 (0.264) (0.274) (0.271) (0.283) (0.273) 
Education: 
Undergraduate  
0.610** 0.616** 0.594* 0.601* 0.545* 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.237) (0.237) (0.229) 
Education: Graduate 0.899*** 0.850** 0.819** 0.784** 0.725** 
 (0.262) (0.261) (0.261) (0.258) (0.247) 
Annual Income: $40-
75K 
0.0414 0.0455 0.0408 0.0226 0.00587 
 (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.147) (0.151) 
Annual Income: $75-
150K 
-0.131 -0.120 -0.113 -0.0887 -0.109 
 (0.155) (0.164) (0.165) (0.170) (0.170) 
Annual Income: >$150K -0.0918 -0.0720 -0.0554 -0.0427 -0.0890 
 (0.217) (0.225) (0.221) (0.207) (0.204) 
Age Group: 40-59 -0.170 -0.168 -0.174 -0.183 -0.240 
 (0.166) (0.169) (0.174) (0.166) (0.167) 
Age Group: 60-69 -0.329 -0.312 -0.294 -0.277 -0.340++ 
 (0.200) (0.203) (0.205) (0.199) (0.197) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -0.471** -0.442** -0.421** -0.382** -0.453** 
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.151) (0.144) (0.140) 
Region: South 0.228 0.177 0.102 0.0522 -0.0253 
 (0.205) (0.199) (0.220) (0.201) (0.200) 
Region: Midwest 0.291 0.330++ 0.198 0.146 0.0448 
 (0.182) (0.181) (0.160) (0.139) (0.139) 
Region: West 0.834*** 0.851*** 1.153*** 0.929*** 0.891*** 
 (0.179) (0.151) (0.139) (0.166) (0.170) 
Visited Israel: Once -0.775*** -0.774*** -0.751*** -0.714*** -0.703*** 
 (0.129) (0.133) (0.130) (0.125) (0.126) 
Visited Israel: > Once -1.698*** -1.652*** -1.650*** -1.551*** -1.498*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) 
Visited Israel: Lived  -1.828*** -1.761*** -1.774*** -1.738*** -1.720*** 
 (0.476) (0.480) (0.473) (0.473) (0.482) 
Native American -0.629*** -0.627*** -0.711*** -0.739*** -0.727*** 
 (0.144) (0.141) (0.146) (0.168) (0.167) 
Rural vs. Urban 
community 
 0.193** 0.0858 0.0950 0.0696 
  (0.0660) (0.0826) (0.0796) (0.0793) 
Annual Household 
Income 
 -0.00455++ -0.00994*** -0.0103*** -0.0111*** 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
  (0.00232) (0.00278) (0.00267) (0.00268) 
College degrees by 
county 
 0.0193** 0.0393*** 0.0373*** 0.0393*** 
 
  (0.00689) (0.00982) (0.00891) (0.00939) 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 






      
Presence of Non-
Christian Congregations 






      
Presence of Jewish 
Congregations 




      
Presence of Chabad 
Congregation 




      
Presence of Orthodox 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Reform 
Congregation 












      
Presence of Jewish 
schools and camps 
    -0.0217*** 
(0.00479) 
      
Presence of JCC, 
Federation, 
Philanthropies 
    -0.0304 
(0.0438) 
      
Constant -0.917*** -0.726 -0.353 -0.247 -0.0503 
 (0.259) (0.554) (1.239) (1.114) (1.089) 
      




A number of important findings emerge across this series of analyses. To begin, 
there are several notable age patterns effects. There is a negative effect of age on 
religious identity, but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95. 
Participants who are this age are statistically less religiously identifiable than people 
younger than them. For cultural identity, there is a positive effect of age, but it is only 
significant for the 60-69 age group. Individuals in this age group are statistically more 
identifiable with cultural Judaism than all other age groups. It is intriguing that the 
identity of the 60-69 cohort, those living in the 1970s, was only ignited in a cultural way. 
This finding is unique because participants in their 60s today were late teens and twenties 
during the 1970s, which is not only an impressionable age for identity formation, but also 
a decade where there was an immense appreciation and support for Israel and Zionism in 
general— a marker of cultural Jewish identity— across the United States. With regard to 
the third measure of identity, denominational switching, we also see a positive effect of 
age on moving into the Conservative and Reform denominations, but it is only significant 
for the oldest category, ages 70-95. The only significant results for moving out of a 
stream is for that of Orthodoxy, as the oldest age group is the most likely to have moved 
out of Orthodox. Finally, for the fourth identity measure, conversion, the oldest age group 
is the least likely group to convert into Judaism. This could be the case because most 
conversion happens for people under age 40, usually in conjunction with marriage. There 
is also a negative effect of age on converting out, but it is only significant for the 70-95 
age group. Thus, these participants are also the least likely group to have converted out of 
Judaism, but with a much smaller comparative effect when looking at converting in (-
.471, p<0.01). Thus, it must be noted that the youngest age group, 18-39, are both the 
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most likely to have converted into Judaism and also the most likely to have converted out 
of Judaism. Without data on age of transition for the older members of the sample we 
cannot know whether this phenomenon is specific to the Millenial age group. But it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that identity is most impressionable and subject to change 
in adolescence and young adulthood. 
There are also important effects of visiting Israel on these four measures of 
identity. There is a positive correlation between visiting Israel and religious identity, yet 
the strongest net effect is when participants have visited Israel more than once, not lived 
there. For cultural identity, the more times participants have visited or lived in Israel, the 
stronger their cultural Jewish identity becomes. Since I coded emotional attachment to 
Israel and visits to Israel in the cultural scale, it is not surprising that these effect are 
much stronger, and positive, on this measure of identity than on the religious scale. With 
regard to the third measure, denominational switching, participants are less likely to 
move out of Orthodox streams if they visited Israel more than once, and almost 
significant if they lived there and also less likely to move out of Conservative if they 
visited Israel once or more than once. This is intuitive as visiting Israel can strengthen 
one’s connection to religion, tradition, and spirituality. Intriguingly, participants are less 
likely to move from Reform if they visited Israel once, but more likely to move out of 
Reform if they visited more than once. Given this exposure to religion and tradition, 
people who visit Israel with a Reform affiliation may choose to realign with 
denomination that stress religious practice more than Reform does. 
The most interesting effects are found on the fourth measure, conversion. 
Participants are much less likely to have converted into Judaism if they have visited Israel 
once, more than once, and even lived there, compared to if that individual has not visited 
Israel at all. Again, the absence of dates makes interpretation difficult. It may be, for 
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example, that the effect is reversed: converts are much less likely to have visited Israel. 
Either way, this negative relationship suggests that people may not feel the need to 
formally convert into Judaism if they are already connected to an important source of 
Jewish identity. This interpretation gets some information support from models looking at 
converting out of Judaism. Here we see a significant negative effect for visiting Israel, 
with the greatest effect seen if one has lived in Israel. As such, participants are much less 
likely to convert out of Judaism if they have visited Israel even once, and especially less 
likely if they have lived there. This may be the case because exposure to Israel revives 
one’s Jewish connection to the land and its people, and as such individuals may be less 
inclined to disassociate from that connection. 
Region of the country where one resides also has notable effects on these four 
measures. For the first measure, religious identity, there is a significant negative effect for 
all regions, with the exception of the Midwest. Furthermore, the West region has a lower 
religious identity than their counterparts on the East coast. With regard to cultural 
identity, there is a negative effect for all regions, but it is only significant for the West. As 
for denominational switching, participants living on the South and Midwest regions are 
more likely to move into Orthodoxy, those in the South are significantly less likely to 
move into Conservative, and those in the Midwest are significantly more likely to move 
into Reform. For movement out of denominations, the only those living in the West are 
more likely to move out of Orthodoxy.  
Lastly, for the fourth measure of identity, conversion, individuals are much more 
likely to have converted into Judaism in every region aside from the East coast. For 
converting out of Judaism, individuals are much more likely to convert out if they live in 
the West coast, but there are no other regional effects. All of these findings are consistent 
with research suggesting that there is the most religious movement and least religious 
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observance in the Western region of the country. This is consistent with longstanding 
research on religious economies in the U.S., as the West coast is the region with the most 
religious movement in general. 
The final individual-level characteristic requiring discussion is the effect of 
growing up with intermarried parents. There is a similarly-sized negative effect of 
intermarried parents on both religious and cultural identities (-1.058, p<.05 and -1.188, 
p.<.001 respectively). For denominational switching, the only significant effect is for 
movement into and out of Conservative, whereby participants are more likely to move 
into and less likely to move out of Conservative if they have intermarried parents. 
Strikingly, participants are more likely to move out of Reform if they have intermarried 
parents (0.556, p<.05). This is surprising since the Reform movement stresses inclusivity, 
which would suggest that children of intermarriage would feel comfortable in this 
movement. Further research should investigate if where these participants moved to, 
although my hypothesis is that they moved out of any denominational affiliation 
altogether. 
Individual-level characteristics aside, I transition into a discussion on the impact 
of institutions on Jewish identity.  To begin, the presence of Jewish schools, camps, and 
congregations have a significantly positive effect on religious identity.  Furthermore, the 
presence of a range in types of Jewish congregations does not have an effect on religious 
identity, however. Perhaps this is the finding because one attends a temple that is in 
alignment with one’s denominational affiliation, and as such having a range of 
denominationally affiliated temples does not impact an individuals’ participation in their 
own congregation. As for cultural identity, there is also a significant effect of living in a 
zip code with a range of temples and Jewish schools and camps on cultural identity. For 
denominational switching, participants are less likely to move into and out of the 
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Orthodox stream if there are schools and camps in their area. With regard to moving out 
of a denomination, the presence of Jewish congregations increases this movement out of 
Reform, however having a range of Jewish congregations makes participants less likely 
to move from the stream. Lastly, for effects on conversion, the more Jewish 
congregations there are in one’s zip code, the more likely one is to convert in. However, 
there is a negative effect of ranges of Jewish congregations on converting in, but it is only 
significant for the presence of Chabad, Orthodox, and Conservative temples. Perhaps 
these denominations are less inclusive than the progressive denominations, and as such 
individuals may be less likely to convert when these are the institutions in their zip code. 
There are different effect on individuals who converted out. Having a range of 
congregations in one’s zip code does not affect this phenomenon, nor does the total 
number of temples. Interestingly, for both converting in and out, the presence of Jewish 
schools and camps has a significant negative effect (-0.0571, p<.05 and -0.0217, p<.001, 
respectively). Interestingly, the presence of JCCs, Philanthropies, and Federations do not 
have a significant impact on religious, cultural, or conversion in, and conversion out 
identities. Overall, it can be seen that the presence of Jewish congregations, and in some 
cases Jewish schools and camps, increases several measures of Jewish identity, and as 
such, it can be concluded that at least some institutions have a significant impact on 
identity. 
Lastly, there are notable effects of the presence of non-Jewish institutions in one’s 
zip code on Jewish identity. For both religious and cultural identities, the presence of 
neither Christian nor Non-Christian congregations has no statistically significant effect on 
reported religious identity. Furthermore, participants are significantly less likely to move 
out of Orthodoxy if there is a presence of non-Christian congregations. Lastly, there are 
almost the same marginal effects seen in converting in and out of Judaism: the more 
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Christian congregations there are in the county where one lives, the more likely one is to 
both convert into and out. In contrast, the more Non-Christian congregations there are, 
the less likely one is to both convert in and out (.327, p <.05 and -.408, p <.05 for convert 
out; .360, p <.05 and -.482, p<.01 for convert in). Further research needs to be done to 
place these Jewish communities in the context of religious participation of the religions 
with greater market position. However, with the data available in this study, the 
conclusion is that the presence of other religious does not mobilize Jews to have stronger 





This paper has explored the key determinants of Jewish identity in the United 
States It is now clear that the youngest age group, Millennials aged 18-39, are the most 
affected in both positive and negative ways, with some unique findings for the older age 
groups. These findings support the hypothesis that identity formation is the most 
formative in adolescence and young adulthood. In addition, going to Israel has a huge 
positive impact on conversion, religious and cultural identities, and intermarriage. With 
regard to intermarriage, there is a negative impact on every measure of identity, although 
this impact is diminished by visiting Israel. With regard to region where one lives, the 
most movement occurs in the West, where there is also the lowest levels of religious and 
cultural Jewish identity. As for religious economy characteristics, it can be seen that the 
presence of Jewish congregations, and in some cases Jewish schools and camps, increases 
several measures of Jewish identity, and as such, it can be concluded that at least some 
institutions have a significant impact on identity. 
The main limitation of this study is the issue of reverse causality. Since the Pew 
dataset did not ask participants when they moved to their current residences, we cannot 
fully distinguish whether levels of Jewish identity are a function of their effort to build up 
the institutions in their communities, or whether the presence of institutions is what drew 
strongly identified Jews to move into these communities. I was able to collect dates of 
establishment for some institutions in the dataset (almost all synagogues, for example), 
and they have no effect on levels of identity. But without data on people’s own 
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geographic mobility we could not compare them with the individuals in the sample, 
which prevented the examination of this phenomenon.  
Further research needs to be done with regard to the Millennial age group. The 
array of significant findings for this age group elucidates the need to delve into these 
phenomena more thoroughly to explore the reasons for this movement and identity 
patterns. Furthermore, because this age group includes the future members of American 
Jewry, it is of the utmost importance to find answers that can help alter the course of 
Jewry in the United States. 
In addition, future research should to place these Jewish communities in the 
context of religious participation of the religions with greater market position, such as 
Protestantism. Since the data only provided the number of congregations, and not 
affiliation information, it is hard to determine the influence of non-Jewish affiliation and 
identification on Jews’ identification and mobilization in these communities.  Similarly, it 
would be worthwhile to distinguish aspects of other religions’ identities in comparison to 
Jewish identity. Indeed, although this study focused on the multi-dimensions of Jewish 
identity, surely other religions have these nuanced aspects of identity. Perhaps there 
would be different effects for different types of identities, or even different sets of 
determinants that affect other religions’ identities.  
Moreover, this research was done solely in the United States context, where 
religious economies are larger and more diverse than in other countries. This is true not 
only for Judaism, but for other religions as well. Given this, Americans have more 
choices afforded to them to express their Jewish identity, whereas abroad these identities 
are more constrained by the lack of access to types of institutions that are available in the 
United States. Thus, future research should expand these questions to other Jewish 
communities, with special consideration taken to those religious economy characteristics 
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and restraints. Along these lines, this study measured spatial models as the same zip code. 
Given the importance of one’s environment, additional studies should examine spatial 
effects more directly by estimating effects with spatial regression techniques.  
Either way, it is clear that the availability of Jewish institutions is associated with 
different measures of Jewish identity, over and above all other individuals and contextual 
effects. This is an important finding. It can be found across the different types of Jewish 
identity. Future research should focus on expanding our ability to identify causal patterns 




Table 8: Interaction Effects of Intermarriage on Religious Identity  
 








measures of Jewish 
religious economy 
    
Education: Some college -0.794* -0.915** -0.689* 
 (0.342) (0.284) (0.300) 
Education: Undergraduate -0.916** -1.478*** -1.210*** 
 (0.332) (0.254) (0.262) 
Education: Graduate -1.954*** -2.366*** -1.904*** 
 (0.391) (0.315) (0.309) 
Annual Income: $40-75K -0.100 -0.258 -0.236 
 (0.241) (0.212) (0.223) 
Annual Income: $75-150K 0.204 -0.0797 -0.158 
 (0.357) (0.259) (0.252) 
Annual Income: >$150K -0.0474 -0.675++ -0.296 
 (0.492) (0.347) (0.317) 
Age Group: 40-59 -1.542** -0.818* -0.496 
 (0.543) (0.398) (0.320) 
Age Group: 60-69 -2.681*** -1.625*** -1.260*** 
 (0.499) (0.368) (0.352) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -2.609*** -2.092*** -1.785*** 
 (0.545) (0.408) (0.349) 
Region: South -0.989++ -0.947* -0.834* 
 (0.545) (0.396) (0.398) 
Region: Midwest -0.639++ -0.561* -0.358 
 (0.374) (0.273) (0.235) 
Region: West -1.369** -1.066** -0.738* 
 (0.436) (0.325) (0.308) 
Visited Israel: Once  1.280*** 1.104*** 
  (0.207) (0.201) 
Visited Israel: > Once  4.778*** 4.147*** 
  (0.356) (0.313) 
Visited Israel: Lived  2.478* 2.405++ 
  (1.052) (1.238) 
Intermarried Parents -4.489*** -2.591*** -1.905*** 
 (0.501) (0.429) (0.397) 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 
  0.459++ 
   (0.238) 
Presence of Non-Christian   -0.412* 
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Congregations 
   (0.185) 
Presence of Jewish Congregations   0.105** 
   (0.0370) 
Presence of Chabad Congregation   0.0437 
   (0.247) 
Presence of Orthodox Congregation   0.324 
   (0.297) 
Presence of Conservative 
Congregation 
  -0.0410 
   (0.362) 
Presence of Reform Congregation   0.419 
   (0.829) 
Presence of Reconstructionist 
Congregation 
  -1.943* 
   (0.857) 
Presence of Jewish schools and 
camps 
 
  0.0692*** 
   (0.0143) 
Presence of JCC, Federation, 
Philanthropies 
  -0.133 
   (0.0933) 
Constant 11.10*** 9.110*** 5.831*** 
 (0.617) (0.478) (1.335) 
    
Observations 4,880 4,880 4,281 
R-squared 0.137 0.333 0.396 
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Table 9: Interaction Effects of Intermarriage on Cultural Identity  
 








measures of Jewish 
religious economy 
    
Education: Some college 0.118 -0.00987 -0.0119 
 (0.216) (0.191) (0.206) 
Education: Undergraduate 0.274 -0.236 -0.213 
 (0.190) (0.160) (0.178) 
Education: Graduate -0.129 -0.524** -0.397* 
 (0.232) (0.192) (0.202) 
Annual Income: $40-75K -0.0390 -0.168 -0.139 
 (0.161) (0.147) (0.142) 
Annual Income: $75-150K 0.294 0.0886 0.0164 
 (0.224) (0.164) (0.158) 
Annual Income: >$150K 0.297 -0.176 -0.135 
 (0.277) (0.192) (0.192) 
Age Group: 40-59 -0.639* -0.0281 0.114 
 (0.287) (0.177) (0.165) 
Age Group: 60-69 -0.924** -0.0273 0.146 
 (0.285) (0.191) (0.194) 
Age Groups: 70-95 -0.530++ -0.0911 0.0751 
 (0.312) (0.206) (0.195) 
Region: South 0.00764 0.0880 0.0213 
 (0.370) (0.257) (0.247) 
Region: Midwest -0.262 -0.187 -0.234 
 (0.231) (0.157) (0.155) 
Region: West -0.603* -0.347* -0.121 
 (0.254) (0.153) (0.156) 
Visited Israel: Once  1.606*** 1.602*** 
  (0.124) (0.124) 
Visited Israel: > Once  3.915*** 3.709*** 
  (0.167) (0.156) 
Visited Israel: Lived  4.640*** 4.642*** 
  (0.476) (0.501) 
Intermarried Parents -3.188*** -1.569*** -1.207*** 
 (0.276) (0.218) (0.204) 
Presence of Christian 
Congregations 
  0.215++ 
(0.124) 
    
Presence of Non-Christian 
Congregations 
  -0.249* 
(0.0977) 
    
Presence of Jewish Congregations   0.0372* 
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(0.0176) 
    
Presence of Chabad Congregation   0.262++ 
(0.146) 
    
Presence of Orthodox Congregation   0.468** 
(0.165) 
    
Presence of Conservative 
Congregation 
  0.505* 
(0.199) 
    
Presence of Reform Congregation   0.0125 
(0.406) 
    
Presence of Reconstructionist 
Congregation 
  0.245 
(0.516) 
    
Presence of Jewish schools and 
camps 
 
  0.0172* 
(0.00724) 
    
Presence of JCC, Federation, 
Philanthropies 
  -0.0422 
(0.0532) 
    
Constant 10.63*** 8.839*** 7.504*** 
 (0.299) (0.216) (0.694) 
    
Observations 4,880 4,880 4,281 
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